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Second Tier Patent Protection

Mark D. Janis*

The problem of access to the patent system, particularly for small enterprises, 1 currently dominates the patent policy debate internationally. Although the access problem can be conceptualized in a variety of
ways, 2 it is often defined narrowly in terms of the prohibitive costs of
3
acquiring and enforcing patent rights.
A number of the responsive strategies currently being implemented
entail direct reform of the regular patent system through fee reductions4 or substantive reforms. However, an important trend emerging
in many regions of the world focuses on an additional strategy in
which access to the patent system is to be enhanced by the expansion
(or, in some cases, the creation) of an entirely separate regime of rights,
known variously as the "utility model," the "petty patent," or, generi-

* Associate Professor ofLaw, University of Iowa College of.Law. B.S., Purdue University, 1986;
J.D., Indiana University, Bloomington, 1989. The author gratefully acknowledges insightful
comments from Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Lemley, and excellent research assistance from
Chris Gaspar, Dorian Cartwright, Sasha Boros, and Heather Lloyd. Research support was also

provided by Dean N. William Hines and the University of Iowa College of Law.
1. I will adopt the European convention of referring to "SMEs" (small and medium-sized enterprises), by which to refer to small-sized technology enterprises and independent inventors.

2. See infra Part IL.A for some examples.
3. See, ag., Michael N. Meller, Planningfor a Global PatentSystem, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK.
OFF. Soc'y 379, 380 (1998) (identifying the cost of worldwide patent coverage as an "overwhelming" problem for patent applicants); Erwin E Berrier, Global Patent Costs Must be Reduced,
36 IDEA 473 (1996); see also Promoting Innovation Through Patents: Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe, Doc. COM(97)314 final § 5.2, at 22-24 (June
1997) (referring to the high cost ofacquiring patent protection in Europe).
4. Concerning fee reductions in the United States, see, e.g., Patent and Trademark Office: Final
Rule Reduces Fees with Expiration of Surcharge, 56 PAT., TM. & COPYRT. J. (BNA) 350 (July 30,
1998); Legislation: House Passes Authorization Bill Decreasing Patent Offie Fees, 56 PAT., TM. &
COPYRT. J. (BNA) 350 (May 14, 1998). Concerning Europe, see Patents Paris Conference Debates
Proposalsto Reduce High Costs of EU Patents, PAT., TM. & COPYRT. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 23, 1997)
(considering proposals to reduce translation costs for patent applications filed with the European

Parent Office); European Patent Office: EPO Announces Fee Reductions in 1997 to Total DEM 140,
PAT., TM. & COPYRT. DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 6, 1997) (announcing 20% fee reductions effective July
1997, for the stated purposes of responding "to calls worldwide for lower patent costs," and

"making European patents more attractive, especially for independent inventors and small and
medium-sized firms"); see also United Kingdom: Patent Office Reduces Patent Examination Fees, PAT.,
Tm. & COPYRT. DAILY (BNA) (Feb. 10, 1997) (announcing a 21% reduction in fees for examination of patent applications filed at the U.K. Patent Office, effective January, 1998, "which will
benefit small and medium-sized enterprises in particular"). Concerning recent fee reductions at
the Japan Patent Office and materials relating to the Third International Symposium on the
Reduction of Patent Costs, June 29-30, 1998, see <http://www.jpo-miti.go>.
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cally, the "second tier patent."5 While these regimes vary considerably,
they commonly feature relatively short-term protection, 6 protectability
standards that may be less rigorous than those applicable to regular
patents, 7 and the granting of rights without any prior examination for
compliance with substantive protectability standards. 8
Second tier protection has been considered a backwater of intellectual property. For example, the TRIPs agreement dutifully establishes
minimum substantive standards for each of the major intellectual property regimes 9 but fails explicitly to mention second tier protection,10
leaving WTO member countries free to formulate or reject second tier
protection regimes as they see fit." The Paris Convention 12 includes
5. Classical "utility model" regimes, as I refer to them, are regimes that feature relatively
short-term protection but reflect origins in design law, particularly by employing a diminished
standard of inventiveness, as compared to regular patent law, and by extending protection only to
subject matter that meets a "three-dimensional form" requirement. See, e.g., infra Part LA (describing classical utility model regimes).
The term "petty patent" refers to regimes that feature relatively short term protection but otherwise closely resemble regular patent systems, especially in regard to inventiveness standards,
See, ag., infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing the Australian petty patent system).
"Second tier patent" is used herein as a generic label encompassing utility models, petty patents, and modern regimes that are comparable to petty patent regimes in that they discard the
three-dimensional form requirement but otherwise borrow heavily from classical utility model
regimes. See infra Part I.C.
Unfortunately, the "utility model" label is used rather indiscriminately in the literature,
masking significant conceptual differences between regimes that require "three-dimensional
form" and those that do not. For example, the European proposal discussed in this paper is denominated a "utility model" proposal even though it is more properly a second tier patent proposal. See infra Part I.C.
6. Typically, second tier regimes offer terms that extend no longer than about ten years from
the application filing date. John Richards, Petty Patent Protection, 2 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY CH. 47, 47-13 (Hugh C. Hansen, ed. 1996) (providing a listing of terms in Table I). By contrast, the international standard for the term of regular patents,
established in Article 33 of the TRIPs component of the GAIT agreement, is twenty years from
the application filing date. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, D.O.S. 95-33, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (Annex IC: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
7. For example, second tier regimes may feature a relaxed version of the obviousness/inventive
step criterion. See, e.g., infra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the diminished inventive
step standard in German law).
8. See, eg., infra note 98 (discussing Japanese law). For a comparative analysis of existing regimes, see infra generally Parr I.B.2.
9. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, UniversalMinimum Standardsof Intellectual PropertyProtection Under
the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Uma Suthersanen, A Brief Tour of "Utility Mode" Lau, 20 EUR. INTBLL. PROP.
REv. 44, 45 (1998) (confirming this observation). See also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at Art,
1(2) (stating that "the term 'intellectual property' refers to all categories of intellectual property
that are the subject of Sections I to 7 of Part II," none of which deal expressly with second tier
patent rights).
11. This may prove to be a significant omission from TRIPs given the increasing popularity of
second tier regimes, especially among developing countries. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
12. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 as last revised at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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second tier protection in its definition of the categories of industrial
property, 13 but, apart from extending national treatment 14 and priority 15 to second tier patents, it establishes no important benchmarks for
this form of protection.
Worldwide interest in second tier patent regimes appears to be substantial. More than sixty countries currently offer second tier patent
protection, including key patenting jurisdictions such as Germany and
Japan. 16 A dozen or more countries have created second tier regimes in
their national patent laws since the mid-1980s.' 7 In North America,
Mexico introduced a second tier regime in the early 1990s,' 8 and at
least one scholar has recently urged that Canada consider second tier
protection.19
Most importantly, the European Commission is moving to expand
the role of second tier regimes at the pan-European level. A proposal to
harmonize existing second tier regimes in EU member states has now
reached an advanced stage of consideration. 20 A harmonized system of
second tier patent protection is now spoken of in Europe as one of the
13. Id. at Art. 1(2) ("The protection of industrial property has as its object ... utility models
."). See also id. at Art. 1(4) ("Patents shall include the various kinds of industrial patents recognized by the laws of the countries of the Union, such as patents of importation, patents of im-

provement, patents and certificates of addition, etc.").
This article, along with several others, has been effectively incorporated into the TRIPs
Agreement. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at Art. 2(1). Accordingly, commentators have generally assumed that TRIPs at least implicitly recognizes the existence of second tier protection,
even though it does not lay out any minimum substantive standards for second tier protection.
See, e.g., Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 45 note 10; J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under theTRIPs Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 74 n.248
(1996-97).
14. Id. at Art. 2(1).
15. Id. at Art. 4(A)(1).
16. Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 44. For a country-by-countty listing, see, e.g., Richards, supra note 6, at 47-15 (Table II).
17. See, ag., Rudolf Krasser, Developments in Utility Model Law, 26 INT'L REV.INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRT. L. 950, 956-57 (1995) (listing countries which have adopted utility model legislation in
the 1980s and 1990s and giving corresponding citations to the relevant legislation).
18. See, e g., Gretchen A. Pemberton & Mariano Soni, Jr., Mexico's 1991 IndustrialProperty Law,
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103, 123 (1992) (relating that Mexico introduced a utility model regime

in 1991).
19. Michael Crinson, Is Some Novel Protectionof Invention Needed in Canada?, 12 INTELL. PROP.
J. 25 (Dec. 1997).
20. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model, COM(97)691 final; O.J. C 36
(Mar. 2, 1998) [White Paper), and the associated Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
on the Proposalfor a European Parliamentand CouncilDirective Approximating the Legal Arrangements
for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model, O.J. C 235, July 27, 1998 thereinafter July 1998
Opinion]. These build on the Green Paper: The Protection of Utility Models in the Single Market, COM(95)370 final, and the associated Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on
the Green Paper: The Protection of Utility Models in the Single Market, O.J. C 174 (June 17,
1996) [hereinafter June 1996 Opinion]. While most of the current EU member states already
have some form of second tier protection, the U.K., Sweden, and Luxembourg currently do not.
See COM(97)691 final, at Part I-B ("Introducing Rules on Utility Model Protection in Those
Countries Where There Are None").
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four "Community pillars for protection of industrial property .... ",21
This trend to embrace second tier patent regimes may ultimately prove
irresistible to the United States, which has never had second tier pat-

ent protection. Indeed, calls for the introduction of second tier protection in United States patent law, though rare, do exist currently.22
In this Article, I argue that proposals for expanding second tier patent protection are largely misguided. In Part I, I describe the features
of classical utility model regimes and consider the quite recent transition from the classic regimes to modern second tier patent regimes. I
argue, contrary to the position that appears to be expressed by policy-

makers in Europe and elsewhere, that there are fundamental conceptual differences between the two regimes and that long experience

with the former should not be mistaken as a justification for the latter.
In Part II, I critically examine second tier patent proposals from a
policy perspective. I find fault with the rationale that second tier regimes can address the access problem, and I express doubts about

whether the harmonization of second tier regimes can serve as a
worthwhile prototype for regional or worldwide substantive harmoni-

zation of regular patent laws. In general, I conclude that second tier
proposals appear to promise far more than they can reasonably deliver

and are particularly deficient in their failure to consider enforcement
costs.

21. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on 'Promoting Innovation through
patents: Green Paper on the Community patent and the patent system in Europe' (98/C 129/03),
Official Journal of the European Communities C 129/8, C 129/11 (Apr. 27, 1998) (listing as the
other "pillars" the Community parent, the Community trademark, and the Community design).
In this Article, I conceptualize second tier protection as a species of patent protection and construct a policy and theoretical analysis that is in keeping with that conceptualization. Other
scholars have considered second tier or utility model protection from the very different perspective of design protection, identifying the utility model as one of several options for the protection
of functional aspects of product configuration. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, FederalizedFunctionalism: The Futureof Design Protection in the European Union, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 611 (1996) (touching on utility model protection in the context of an assessment of Community design proposals);
J.H. Reichman, Industrial Designs and Utility Models Under the European Communities' Proposed
Initiatives: A CriticalAppraisal, in 2 INT'L INTrLL. PROP. L. & POL'Y CH. 48, 48-10 to 48-11
(1996) (Hugh Hansen, ed.) (identifying utility model protection as the proposed fourth layer of
intellectual property rights in functional designs, the other layers including design and copyright
regimes); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne
Revision of 1948 to the Cop)rightAct of 1976, 1983 DuKE LJ. 1143, 1215-20 (1983) (discussing
the Italian Design law of 1940, which encompassed both design and utility model protection).
22. See, eg., Prior Commercial Use and Patent Infringement: Hearings Before the House Committee on
theJudiciary,Subcommittee on Courts, and IntellectualProperty, 104th Cong. 21 (1995) (statement of
Professor Karl F.Jorda):
It is not possible and practicable to obtain patents on all patentable albeit marginal inventions and it would be much too costly. (In this context it would be a very good idea to establish a utility model or petty patent system or short-term patent system as have existed or
are now being introduced in most foreign countries. Such a system would narrow the perceived gulf between patent and trade secrets and permit the patenting of marginal inventions at affordable costs.)
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In Part III, I explore the theoretical ramifications of second tier patent protection. I first propose that second tier regimes may encourage
the subdivision of patent rights into narrowly defined bundles spread
among a large number of follow-on improvers. Applying recent scholarship in property theory, I assess whether second tier patent regimes
may give rise to a "tragedy of the anticommons."
I next consider the economic consequences of the diminished or
"soft" obviousness standard featured in second tier proposals. I conclude that while Professor Kitch's "prospect" theory of patent systems
arguably supplies an alternative economic basis for the second tier regime's soft obviousness standard, the many criticisms of that theory
apply with particular force to second tier patent regimes.
Finally, I consider second tier regimes as raising the question of
whether a property regime or a liability regime is better suited to achieving socially optimal levels of subpatentable innovation. Here I briefly
note Professor Reichman's warnings against the proliferation of intellectual property hybrids and his conclusion that the protection of subpatentable innovation is better left to liability regimes than to a new
layer of patent rights.
I. THE TRANSITION FROM UTILITY MODEL REGIMES TO
SECOND TIER PATENT REGIMES
Utility model regimes have existed in some countries for over one
hundred years. 23 It might be tempting to use this fact to subvert any
extensive policy or theoretical discussion of utility model protection,
on the basis that if utility models have not fomented disaster by now,
they are unlikely to do so any time in the near future. Indeed, the deseems to lean
bate over harmonizing second tier protection in Europe
24
heavily on this assumption of historical precedent.
Closer examination, however, reveals that the historical experience
with classical utility model regimes is manifestly less instructive for
current debates than proponents might assume. The principal reason is
that utility model protection, viewed over time, cannot properly be
understood as a monolith. An analysis of utility model regimes existing in intellectual property systems over the past century reveals a critical
conceptual transition, from classical utility model regimes originating
in design protection concepts, to modern second tier patent proposals
that represent the culmination of a dramatic transition towards patent
concepts. Thus, the starting point for a proper analysis of second tier
patent proposals is to set them against a more precise historical context. With the benefit of that context, modern second tier regimes dip

23. The German utility model system is perhaps the best known. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of current European proposals.
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very deeply into patent concepts and implicate patent policy and theory concerns more powerfully than modern proposals may appreciate.
A. ClassicalUtility Model Regimes
The concept of a utility model has been known overseas for at least
150 years. The earliest antecedent to classical utility model regimes
appears to be the United Kingdom's Utility Designs Act of 1843.25
Early in the nineteenth century, turmoil in the regular British patent
system 2 6 and in the design protection laws spawned reform efforts
which eventually yielded two new acts: the Ornamental Designs Act of
1842 and the Utility Designs Act of 1843.27 Both regimes were administered by the Designs Registry.28 The Ornamental Designs Act
protected ornamental designs that had been applied to articles of manufacture. 29 The Utility Designs Act protected designs for the shape or
configuration of useful articles of manufacture. 30
Even though the Utility Designs Act of 1843 came into being in
part as a result of perceived inadequacies in the regular patent system,
the Act's approach to eligible subject matter was firmly rooted in principles of design protection that were conceptually remote from regular
patent protection. Some commentators, at least, considered that the
Act's limitations on eligible subject matter also qualified the scope of
protection that should logically be accorded to a design registered under the Utility Designs Act: only external appearance or "form," not
function or principle, was protected. 31 In practical terms, this meant
that the scope of protection was limited to the form of the article as
depicted in the drawing, 32 a dramatically narrower range of coverage
25. 6 & 7 Vict. ch. 65. For an excellent recent discussion, see Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman,
The United Kingdom's Forgotten Utility Afodel: The Utility Designs Act of 1843, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q.
265 (1997). See also STEPHEN P. LADAS, 2 PATENTS, TRADEHARKS, AND R13LATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECriON § 548 (1975) (describing the Utility Designs Act of

1843 as the probable first utility model regime).
26. Notably, detractors argued that the British patent system was too administratively complex, and the application procedure too costly and time consuming, Bently, supra note 25, at
267-68, demonstrating a remarkable historical continuity in complaints against patent offices

extending from the early 19th century to the present day.
27. Id. at 268.
28. Id. at 269.
29. Id. at 268. This is reminiscent of the subject matter provision appearing in the current
U.S. design parent statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1995) ("Whoever invents any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor. .
30. Bently, supranote 25, at 268.
31. Id.at 270 (citing the views of Carpmael and Webster).
32. Id.at 271. In this respect, as well, the regime compares loosely to current U.S. design patent law. U.S. design patent documents feature a pro forma claim accompanied by drawings that
constitute the reference point for establishing the scope of protection. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a)
(1998). See also Dobson v.Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1886) (accepting a claim for a design that
referred to the accompanying drawings using the phrase "as shown"); Dobson v. Hartford Carpet
Co., 114 U.S. 439, 446 (1885) (same); In re Mann, 861 E2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The
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than would be afforded by, for example, a modern utility patent system
resting on peripheral claiming principles. 33 This view established the
basic pattern for the classical utility model regime that emerged later
in Germany 34 and which still exists today in selected countries. 35
From the outset, however, other commentators insisted that the
Utility Designs Act of 1843 had actually created a surrogate patent
system. Seeming to substitute the Act's motivation for its actual language, 36 these commentators argued, for example, that the scope of a
utility design could extend to functional equivalents of the embodiment illustrated in the drawing. 37 This pressure for dramatic expansion of the role of the utility model system seems to have resurfaced
periodically throughout the history of utility model regimes and has
manifested itself most recently in legislative proposals in Europe and
38
Australia, as well as in recent scholarly literature.
Interest in the U.K. utility designs regime flared briefly but then
fell off sharply in the late nineteenth century, finally being reduced to
insignificance by a series of judicial and legislative actions culminating
in 1919. 39 However, the essential character of the classical utility
model regime had been established. When Germany introduced its
utility model regime in 1891,40 it remained firmly and essentially a
creature of design protection. The German system in turn became the
prototype for numerous other utility model regimes.
While the U.K. Utility Designs system sprang from dissatisfaction
with the cumbersome administrative procedures entailed in obtaining
U.K. protection, it appears that the genesis of the German system de-

claim... is limited to what is shown in the application drawings.").
33. For a concise explanation of peripheral claiming theory, see, e.g., TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND JAPAN CH. 1 (1995).
34. See infra Part I.B.

35. See infra Part I.C.
36. While there seems to have been abundant evidence that the infirmities of the patent system stimulated the efforts to create the Utility Designs Act, it is unclear if the Act, taken at face
value, really created an all-purpose alternative to the patent system. It seems questionable that
the Act really was, as some commentators put it, an "act for making patents cheap" and emancipating inventors from "that enormous load of oppression, which our wretched and monstrously

expensive system of patent law has for ages imposed on them ....Bently, supra note 25, at 269
n.26 (citing sources for this view).
37. Id. at 272.

38. See infra Part I.C.
39. Id. at 276-77. Reforms to the regular patent system appear to have stimulated the trend

away from the utility designs regime (referring to reforms to the complexity and cost structure of
patent office administration). This exemplifies a dynamic between regular patent reform and the
evolution of utility model regimes that should be recognized as relevant today. See infra note 235
and accompanying text.
The utility model as a formal legal regime has never reappeared in U.K. intellectual property
law, although one scholar has argued that the unregistered design right may be analogous to the
classical form of utility model. See WaIuAm CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3-32 (1996),
citedin Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 48, note 42.
40. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 6, at 47-2 (referring to the effective date).
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rived in part from the traditionally stringent German patentability
standards. German patent law at the time required that inventions
represent a technischer Fortschritt,or "technical step forward in the art,"
a standard that reportedly was too elevated to be met by minor inven2
tions.4 1 Accordingly, Germany introduced the Gebrauchsnuster sys43
tem, which featured a lower standard of inventiveness, no pre-grant
examination,4 and a very short term of protection (three years from
45
the application date, renewable for an additional three-year term).
Conceptually, the German system was not a supplemental patent regime.4 6 The German system expressly limited utility model subject
matter to movable articles having three dimensions. 47 Subject matter
such as processes, which presumably would have fallen within the
scope of eligible subject matter in the regular patent regime, were
unequivocally excluded from the utility patent regime, 48 as were electrical circuitry and other articles whose external appearance were unrelated to their functionality.49 In short, the German utility model re-

41. Id.See also LADAs, supra note 25, § 548, at 949.
42. Ladas reports that the term Gebrauchsmusteris "the German rendering of the Old English
term 'Useful Design' or 'Useful Model."' LADAs, stipra note 25, § 554, at 950.
43. Id. § 552, at 953 (referring to the "milder approach to the requirements of technical advance or inventive activity" that characterizes the German Gebrauchsmuttersystem and its progeny); Roland Liesegang, German Utility Models after the 1990 Reform Act, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4-5
(1992) ("The inventive level required for utility models has always been lower than that for parents...").
44. LAD^S, supra note 25, § 554, at 954; E. Hausser, Utility Models: The Experience of the Fcdcral
Republic ofGermany, 26 INmus. PROp. (No. 1) 314, 316 (July/August 1987) (explaining that the
German system has not traditionally featured examination for compliance with novelty, inventive
step, and industrial applicability; rather, there is simply an examination for formal requirements
and for subject matter eligibility).
45. LADs, supra note 25, § 555, at 954.
46. Krasser, supra note 17, at 953 (asserting that utility model protection was introduced as a
supplement to 1876 legislation protecting copyrights and designs). Patent protection for functional designs was apparently available under the Patent Act of 1877, but only at great expense.
Id.
47. Liesegang, supra note 43, at 2 (describing utility model protection under the traditional
regime as being limited to "'working tools and implements, articles of everyday use or parts
thereof,' that is, to three-dimensionally configured movables ('Raumform-Efordernis' - threedimensional concrete shape requirement)"). See also LADAs, supra note 25, § 551, at 952 (also
emphasizing that the article must have "a definite shape"); COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 63
(citing German language sources on the historical rationale for the spatial form requirement).
The absence ofany reference to "invention" in the subject matter provision of the utility model
legislation provides further support for the view that the legislation was not originally conceptualized as creating a second tier patent regime. Krasser, supra note 17, at 953 (reporting that the
provision called for the protection of "models of working equipment or utility articles or parts
thereof... to the extent that a new design, arrangement or device is intended to serve the working or utility purpose.").
48. Seealso LADAS, supra note 25, § 551, at 952 (confirming the point).
49. Ladas reports a decision in which an electrical connection was held to fall outside the scope
of eligible subject matter for a utility model because the external appearance of the connection
was deemed not essential to the functionality. However, a different result followed where "the
innovation inherent in the electrical connection [was] directly due to specific features of shape in
regard to the mechanical construction .... ". Id. The latter decision seems to reflect similar pres-
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gime was a classic utility model regime-that is, one that is characterized by a "pristine purpose" tied inextricably to design protection:
to prevent third parties from duplicating the external configurations
of certain handtools and other everyday implements whose creative contribution felt chronically short of the inventive height that
50
the mature patent paradigm required.
Thus, the classic utility model regime, as exemplified by German
legislation, was originally conceived as a form of design protection.
Any claims that the long history of classical utility model regimes
justifies the creation and expansion of second tier patent regimes
throughout Europe and elsewhere must be viewed with some skepticism. In fact, there has been relatively little experience with actual
second tier systems.
B. The Transition to Second Tier PatentRegimes
Given the critical conceptual differences between classical utility
model protection and second tier protection, one must look more judiciously to construct the appropriate historical context for modern second tier proposals. Such an approach reveals a pair of potential sources
of experience on the operation of true second tier systems: (1) the
regular patent systems in the United States and the U.K., which arguably lapsed into de facto second tier protection in the mid-twentieth
century by default through desultory application of the obviousness/inventive step standard; and (2) recently enacted "utility model"
and "petty patent" systems which have dispensed with a threedimensional "spatial form" requirement (such as in the post-1990
German system, the Australian system, and selected others).
1. De Facto Second Tier Patent Regimes
Neither the U.S. nor the U.K. regular patent systems sought to develop second tier patent systems in the twentieth century. It is reasonable to argue, however, that both jurisdictions allowed de facto second
tier patent regimes to develop, albeit under somewhat different cirsure for expanding the role of the utility model regime as seen in connection with commentary on
the U.K. Utility Designs Act of 1843.
50. J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property
Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 797, 808 (1992) (ascribing to utility model laws this "pristine

purpose").
Shortly after the introduction of the utility model regime in Germany, Japan introduced a
utility model regime featuring substantive examination prior to grant. Richards, supra note 6, at
47-2. Like the German system, the Japanese regime employed a three-dimensional shape requirement. See Nobuo Monya, Revision of theJapanesePatent and Utility Model System, 3 PAc. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 227, 241-42 (1994).
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cumstances. In the U.K., under the Patents Act of 1949, the patent
office examined regular patent applications only for novelty, not for
inventive step. 51 Inventive step only came into issue if a third party
initiated an administrative opposition proceeding against the grant of
patent protection (or a post-grant administrative cancellation proceeding), 52 or if a third party (e.g., a defendant in an infringement action) initiated a revocation action in court. 53 Even in these instances,
the inventive step standard was considerably more relaxed than predominant standards today. For example, in an opposition, the opposer
bore the burden of showing that the claimed invention was "clearly
lacking in inventive step,"' 4 and all doubts were resolved in favor of
the patentee. 55 Similarly, in litigation, courts frequently formulated
the inventive step requirement as entailing the need to show only a
"scintilla of invention." 56 This collection of rules arguably gave rise to
a de facto second tier patent system that became an unacknowledged
57
adjunct to the regular patent system.

51. Patents Act, 1949, § 7, reprintedin 2d JOHN P. SINNOTT & WILLIAM JOSEPH COTREAU,
WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE at Great Britain-7-8 (1997).
52. Patents Act, 1949, § 14, reprintedin SINNOrr & COTREAU, supra note 51, at Great Britain-13-15 (concerning pre-grant opposition proceedings); Patents Act, 1949, § 33 reprinted in

SINNOxTT & COTREAU, supra note 51, at Great Britain-37 (specifying that the grounds for cancellation were the same as those for opposition).
53. Patents Act, 1949, § 32(0, reprintedin SINNOTT & COTREAU, spra note 51, at Great Britain-35. For additional commentary on the limited powers of the Patent Office to determine inventive step under the 1949 Patents Act, see CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS,

C.I.P.A. GUIDE TO THE PATENTS ACT pt. 1, § 3.09, at 72 (4th ed. 1995) (James Lahore, ed.).
54. Clifford Lees, Do Design Problems Point to Second-Tier Protection, 14 CAN. INTELL. PROP.
REv. 213, 215 (1998) [hereinafter Lees, Design Problems]; Patents Act, 1949, § 14 (1)(e), reprinted
in SiNNOrr & COTREAU, supra note 51, at Great Britain-14. See also C.I.P.A. GUIDE, snpra note
53, app. § A014, at 1140.
55. See, e.g., Re Canon Kabushiki Kaisha's Patent Application (Chancery Div., Patents Ct. July
24, 1985) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File) (stating that in section 14 oppositions, "any doubt
[was) resolved in favour of the patentee..."). See also C.I.P.A. GUIDE, supra note 53, app. § A014,
at 1140 (citing General Electric's (Cox's) Patent, [1977] R.P.C. 421, 437 ("[S]ection 14 is designed to clear the register of patents which are manifestly untenable. It is not intended to provide a method of disposing of truly contentious cases.")).
56. See Samuel Parkes & Co., Ltd. v. Cocker Bros. Ltd., [1929] 46 R.P.C. 241, 248 (articulating the "scintilla of invention" standard). Progeny of Samuel Parkes & Co. include Technograph v.
Mills & Rockley, [1972] R.P.C. 346, 360 (1971) (reciting the "scintilla" standard); Non-Drip
Measure Co., Ltd. v. Strangers, Ltd., [1943) 60 R.P.C. 135, 142-43. The "scintilla" formulation
proved so durable that modern courts, especially those applying the Patents Act, 1977, have
frequently found it necessary to warn parties that it is no longer the applicable standard. See, e~g.,
M6lnlycke AB v. Proctor & Gamble Ltd. (No. 5), [1994] R.P.C. 49, 112 (1993) (warning that in
applying modem notions of inventive step, it is not useful "to extract from older judgments
expressions such as 'that scintilla of invention necessary to support a patent"'). But cf. Conoco

Specialty Prods. v. Merpro Montassa, [1994] ES.R. 99, 117 (1990) (noting, en route to a determination on inventive step, that the claimed invention at issue "cannot properly be said to be
devoid of a scintilla of invention...").
57. Lees, supra note 54, at 215 ("[D]efacto protection was effective in the twilight zone, where
there was clear novelty but validity [in the form of compliance with the inventive step requirement] was dubious."); see also Clifford Lees, Does the UnitedKingdom Need Second Tier Protection?,
PATENT WORLD, Sept. 1994, at 17-18 [hereinafter Lees, Second Tier Protection] (arguing that the
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A similar pattern may be observed in mid-twentieth-century U.S.
patent law. United States law at the time provided, first by judicial
construction and later by statute, 58 that U.S. patent protection could
be sustained against challenge only if the claimed subject matter demonstrated some level of inventiveness. 59 Nevertheless, there was a widespread perception, especially during the middle part of the century,
that the Patent Office was applying the obviousness standard rather
indifferently.60 To the extent that this tendency went unchecked in the
courts, the United States, at least at certain times, in certain art areas,
had a de facto second tier patent regime. At the very least, the Patent
Office's desultory application of the obviousness standard may have
been a response to the lack of any formal utility model protection.
Likewise, the well-documented judicial hostility to patent protection
that dominated Supreme Court rhetoric in the mid-twentieth century
may have been a reaction to the prospect of de facto second tier protec61
tion.
Some interesting lessons can be drawn from the U.K. and U.S. experiences. First, as one U.K. commentator has observed, second tier patent protection "will always try to establish itself."62 But this certainly
does not mean that the only response to this inevitable pressure is to
create a wholly separate regime of second tier property rights. Indeed,
the U.K. and U.S. experiences counsel otherwise. If worthy "second
tier" inventions are indeed going unprotected, then the problem might
be redressed through reform of the regular patent system by lowering
the obviousness standard.

1949 Patents Act was one of three possible routes by which an applicant might acquire the
equivalent of second tier patent protection).
The 1977 Patents Act altered the conditions that gave rise to defacto second tier protection by
placing inventive step within the scope of the Patent Office's pre-grant substantive examination
duties. See Lees, Design Problems, supranote 54, at 218; Patents Act, 1977 §§ 1(1Xb), 3, reprintedin
TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS app. 15, at 539 (14th ed. 1994) (David Young et al. eds.).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (added to the patent statute in 1952).
59. Under the current statutory standard, the level of inventiveness is defined objectively, by
use of the now-conventional obviousness criterion, requiring analysis of whether "the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 &
Supp. 11995).
in the statutory presumption that issued
60. As a result, many judges placed very little faith
patents are valid. See, eg., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HAxv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-12 (1997) (discussing judicial
hostility towards the presumption ofvalidiry and collecting sources).
61. SeeJerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,94 CoLUM. L. REv.2432, 2459 n.117 (1994) (observing that "countries without utility model laws
experience pressures on the patent law to protect minor technical inventions" and that "the antipatent attitude of the Supreme Court throughout most of the twentieth century may be viewed,
in part, asexpressing resistance to utility models in disguise.").
62. Lees, Second Tier Protection,supranote 57, at 17.
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Second, while second tier advocates could reasonably point to the
possible existence of de facto second tier regimes in the United Kingdom and the United States over some time period, the history of such
regimes is subtle one. They do not adequately support claims that second tier patent protection is a matter of long experience.
2. Modern Second Tier Patent Regimes
a. German Departure from the Classical Model
Perhaps due to its essential orientation towards design protection
rather than patent protection, as manifested in the Raumform (spatial
form) requirement, the German utility model system remained a relatively minor figure on the intellectual property landscape for most of
the twentieth century. However, recent events seem to have stimulated
a resurgence in interest in protection for "minor" inventions via a protection scheme that departs from the classical utility model regime and
instead approaches a second tier patent regime.
Formal transition in the German utility model regime commenced
with efforts to achieve Europe-wide harmonization of the regular patent system. 63 In order to comply with the European Patent Convention
of 1978, Germany abolished its relatively strict "technical step forward" standard for inventiveness, replacing it with the less rigorous
erfinderische Tdtigkeit standard, intended to correspond with inventive

63. Some scholars have suggested that informal transition towards a second tier patent regime
occurred earlier. The spatial form requirement, a central conceptual feature of the utility model
system, imposed a significant restriction not only on the subject matter eligible for protection,
but also on the scope of protection. If the scope of protection extended only to the external appearance of a functional design (as the spatial form requirement would seem to imply), then
competitors in many cases might readily be able to design around it, thereby appropriating the

finctionaliry while varying the external appearance. Apparently some German courts found this
intolerable and looked for ways effectively to confer protection for the functional advance itself.
This was analogous to parent protection. As one scholar puts it:
With time, the view came to prevail that the subject matter of utility model protection was
not by its
very nature different from that of patent protection, but that both cases involved
an invention in the sense of instructions for technical action. The requirement for spatial
form was thus reduced to the function of limiting the scope of application of utility model
protection to a sub-group of the types of invention for which patent protection is available.
The design-law origins of the requirement were thereby lost to view.
Krasser, sapra note 17, at 954. See also FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER ET AL., GERMAN INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT

AND ANTITRUST LAws I/A/7 (1996) (claiming that "[n]otwithstanding

the term 'utility model' and the restriction to inventions in three-dimensional form, the utility
model was in substance a 'petitpatent."').
A similar transition reportedly was observed in Japanese utility model law. Monya, supra note
50, at 242 ("The practice under the Japanese utility model system has not been very strict with
respect to the scope of subject matter. For example, electric circuits have been registered as utility
models . .and

even buildings and innovations in materials have been registered. These registra-

tions did not meet the subject requirement of being an article ....Therefore, the utility model
system has in practice been confused with the system for petit inventions.").
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step standard. The inventiveness standard for utility models, in turn,
was adjusted to erfinderischerSchritt, which was intended to correspond
to an even lower standard. 64 In addition, Germany gave up its sixmonth grace period for regular patents, 65 but (because harmonization
did not extend to utility models) retained it for utility models.
Reportedly, the net effect of these changes, incorporated into German utility model law in 1986, was to give the German utility model
regime "a new lease on life."66 Perhaps more significantly, the 1986
reform gave real momentum to proposals to abolish the spatial form
limitation on eligible subject matter.67 By 1989, a governmentcommissioned report recommended deletion of the spatial form requirement, in part as a recognition of probable judicial practices, 68 and
perhaps, in part due to an apparent disconnection between the spatial

64. SeeLiesegang, supra note 43, at 5 (explaining that while the erfinderischeTiitigkeit standard
for regular patents translates to "inventive activity" and the erfinderischerSchritt standard for utility models translates as "inventive step," this confusion traces to problems in the official translation of the European Patent Convention and it is accepted that the erfinderischerSchritt standard is
in fact a lower standard than that which prevails across Europe for regular patents).
65. A "grace period" in this context is the time period following a public disclosure of an invention during which the inventor may file a patent application and avoid having the public
disclosure qualify as a parent-defeating prior act against him. United States law, for example,
person shall be
currently allows a one-year "grace period." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (providing that "[a)
entitled to a patent unless the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
thisor a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the applicationforpatent in the UnitedStates...") (emphasis added).
66. Richards, supra note 6, at 47-3. It is less than clear if the change in the inventiveness standard alone would have caused a resurgence in the German utility model system. Indeed, a
significant lowering of the inventiveness standard for regular patents, along with more modest (if
any) lowering of the inventiveness standard for utility models, might logically have been expected to channel more applicants towards the regular patent system. However, the retention of
the grace period for utility models undoubtedly is perceived as a substantial advantage, and
therefore it does seem plausible that the net effect of the changes was to intensify interest in
utility model protection. See, eg., Hausser, supra note 44, at 314 (asserting that the grace period
makes the German utility model law particularly attractive to small enterprises, where pre-filing
disclosure of inventions is more commonplace).
67. Proposals for dropping the spatial form limitation were apparently advanced in the course
of the discussions leading to the 1986 reform but were not adopted. See, e.g., Friedrich Kretschmet, Statutory Changes in German IndustrialProperty and Copyright Lau--An Ovrview, 18 INT'L
REV.INDus. PROP. & COPYRT. L. 767, 770 (1987) (reporting that the government authorized a
study of the matter with a report to be delivered within two years); Hausser, supra note 44, at 315
(noting that the spatial form requirement had generated excessive litigation and endorsing proposals to abolish it). However, while the spatial form requirement was temporarily maintained,
the scope of eligible subject matter was expanded slightly to include electrical circuits so long as
they could be shown to constitute part of another article meeting the spatial fbrm requirement.
Id.; see also Liesegang, supra note 43, at 3 (stating that electrical circuits would be eligible for
utility model protection under the post-1986 law "if they form part of a physically concrete
article and do not represent general circuit diagrams").
68. See, e.g., Krasser, supra note 17, at 956 (observing that the report "argued that the utility
model, intended in 1891 as an industrial and technical protection right between patent and
design protection for 'small inventions,' had developed over the years into a property right that
supplemented patent protection. There were no obvious legal policy reasons for restricting this
right to materially embodied inventions.").
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form requirement as a subject matter limitation and the scope of pro69
tection.
The proposal was adopted in 1990. Under the 1990 reform, the spatial form requirement was deleted, and the German utility model system was extended to include chemical and electrical inventions in addition to mechanical inventions, a scope of eligible subject matter essentially congruent to that of the regular patent regime. 70 Perhaps
more importantly, any remaining uncertainty over whether the utility
model's scope of protection extended only to the external appearance of
the protected invention, or to the invention itself, was firmly resolved
71
in favor of the latter.
The 1990 changes represent the culmination of a dramatic conceptual shift in the German utility model system. 72 Utility model protection in Germany can no longer properly be characterized as a close
cousin of design protection. It is, instead, a very different and potentially much broader protection that is only barely distinguishable from

69. The Green Paper refers to the "conundrum" under which spatial form is required as a
subject matter condition, but the actual protected subject matter is really the invention itself.
COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 55. Not surprisingly, in some national systems that continue
using a spatial form requirement in their subject matter provisions, it is not easy to determine
whether merely the spatial form or the actual invention is protected. Id.
70. See Utility Model Act § 1 (1993) ("As utility models shall be protected inventions that are
new, are based on an inventive step and are susceptible to industrial application."). For an English
translation of the Act, see BEIER, supra note 63, at I/B/201-215.
The congruency between the subject matter provisions in the Utility Model Act and the Patent Act is not perfect, because methods continue to be excluded from protection. Utility Model
Act § 2(3) (English translation reprintedin BEIER, supra note 63, at I/B/20 1.). See also Liesegang,
supranote 43, at 3-4, explaining that
The legislature's reason for continuing to exclude methods was to avoid protection scope uncertainty. Utility model disclosure requirements were not thought sufficient to provide a
reasonably reliable guide to what methods the model would cover.
This sounds rather like a policy judgment thinly cloaked in analytic terms, and may reflect a
latent sense of discomfort about the outer reaches of utility model protection.
71. See Utility Model Act § 12a (1993):
The extent of protection of the utility model shall be determined by the content of the
claims. However, the description and the drawings shall be consulted for interpretation of
the claims.
BEIER, supranote 63, at I/B/206.
72. Although it seems indisputable that the spatial form requirement is the central conceptual
feature of a classical utility model regime, commentators discussing the fate of the spatial form
requirement around the time of the 1990 amendments focused on the erosion of the requirement
and the complex case law that it had generated. See supra note 63. By 1990, the requirement was
being viewed as a means to ensure that the subject matter of utility models would be limited to
technically simple inventions, for which assessments of protectability and scope of protection
could, in theory, be easily carried out. See Krasser, supra note 17, at 954 (reporting this new
justification). This justification could readily be attacked on a variety of grounds. Id. at 954-55
(observing that inventions having spatial form are not necessarily technically simple, and that the
difficulty of assessing protectabilicy and scope of protection would seem to have more to do with
other factors, such as whether there are many similar inventions and whether the claims are
drafted clearly, than with spatial form). These arguments, in addition to the complexity (and
consequent cost) of applying the spatial form case law, made the demise of the spatial form requirement seem more a matter of inevitability than a significant conceptual reorientation.
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patent protection. 73 Indeed, while Germany has retained the label
"utility model," it is, in view of the conceptual basis of the current
system, a misnomer, and this unfortunate choice of terminology has
persisted in current European proposals. The Gebrauchsmustersystem is
now a full-fledged second tier patent regime. Thus, to the extent that
current second tier proponents look to the history of German utility
model protection to justify harmonization, they must restrict themselves to the very recent history of the amended German system.
b. The Australian Experiment with "Petty Patents"
Current Australian patent law provides for a grant of second tier
patent protection known as "petty patent" protection. 74 Petty patent
protection first appeared in Australian patent law by way of the Patents Amendment Act of 1979, 75 and it provides a very short-term protection 76 period without substantive pre-grant examination. 77 The rationales for the creation of the Australian petty patent system generally
echo the arguments made in Great Britain in the early nineteenth century to justify the creation of the Utility Designs system: to provide a
form of intellectual property protection that could be obtained more
quickly and more cheaply than regular patent protection. 78 To these
general rationales was added the important, more specific observation
that regular patent protection might prove to be of limited value

73. Professor Reichman views this trend as a general phenomenon. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman,
Chartingthe Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy: Premisesfor a Restructured InternationalIntellectual PropertySystem, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ETr. LJ.475, 500 n.109 (1995) ("Over time, utility
model laws tend to degenerate into longer and stronger petty patent regimes that provide patent-

like protection of small inventions generally, for a relatively short period of time. In this form,
they become less strictly tied to three-dimensional, functional shapes of tools and everyday im-

plements.").
74. The provisions pertaining to the petty patent are interspersed with provisions on regular
patent protection in the Patents Act, 1990. For the full text of the Patents Act, 1990, see 1990
Aust. Act 83 (updated as of June 30, 1995). Currently, Australia is considering proposals to

transform the petty patent system into an "innovation patent" system. See infra notes 109-122
and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., SAse RICKETSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 796 (1994). For a brief note on the legislative origins of the Australian petty patent provisions, see JAMES LAHORE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AUSTRALIA § 1.1.008-.009, at

515-16 (1990) (noting that the legislation originated from committee proposals that were prepared in response to a 1970 Attorney-General's request to analyze the feasibility of introducing
utility model protection in Australia).

76. Petty patents are granted for an initial term of one year from the date of filing. Patents
Act, 1990, § 68(a). However, an owner who complies with specified formal requirements can

extend the protection for a time period ending six years from the date of filing. Parents Act,
1990, § 68(b).
77. The relevant provisions confer discretion on the Commissioner as to whether to engage in
substantive pre-grant examination. Patents Act, 1990, § 50(1). However, it appears that in the
ordinary course, the Commissioner has issued petty patents without substantive examination. For
a description of the examination procedure, see LAHORE, supra note 75, § 1.2012, at 550-51.
78. Id.
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commercially for classes of goods having relatively short commercial
lifetimes (e.g., products whose commercial lifetimes ended before a
79
regular patent application was even granted).
The principal innovation in the Australian approach to second tier
patent protection lay in the scope of eligible subject matter. There was
no effort to limit petty patent protection to external product configurations along the lines of the classical utility model regime. Instead, anticipating modern proposals, the Australian provisions drew no distinction between regular patents and petty patents concerning the
scope of eligible subject matter.80
The creation of the Australian petty patent system is an important
milestone in the trend away from the classical utility model regime
and towards second tier patent regimes. Unfortunately, certain peculiarities of the petty patent system prevent it from serving as a particularly attractive historical antecedent against which to test the claims of
current proponents of second tier protection. Most notably, the Australians apply the same standards for obviousness/inventive step to
both regular patents and utility patents.81 This curiosity, as much as
any other feature of the petty patent system, probably accounts for its
under-utilization. 8 2 It also places the Australian petty patent system on
a different conceptual footing than current proposals.

79. Id., quoting speech of Honourable Ian McPhee, Minister of Productivity, Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, vol. H of R 113, at 183, 21 February 1979 (petty patent provisions were

directed towards products that "individually have a short commercially exploitable life, such

as

household or office accessories, gadgets, small appliances and so on ... [and] which now go

largely unexploited or unprotected or both due to deficiencies in existing patent protection.").
80. See Australian Patents Act, 1990, § 18; Richards, supra note 6, at 47-14. On the other
hand, the petty patent provisions do provide that a petty patent can only include a single claim.

Patents Act 1990, § 40(2Xc). Commentators have suggested that this limitation (as opposed to
any limitation on the scope of eligible subject matter) "was intended to limit the field of protection.. .".
LAHoRE,supra note 75, at § 1.1.009, p. 515.
81. Australian Patents Act, 1990, § 7(2). For an example of a decision applying regular patent
standards for inventive step to a petty patent, see Elconnex Pry., Ltd. v. Gerard Industries Pry.,
Ltd., (1992) 25 IP.R. 173 (Full Fed. Cr.) (concluding that the claimed subject matter would have
been obvious).

Some important qualifications should be noted. Fitrst, the prior art base for regular patents is
much more inclusive than that for petty patents. Australian Patents Act, 1990, Schedule 1
(defining "prior art base" to include only publicly accessible information that is available locally,
but extending the definition for standard patents to include publicly accessible information even
if not available locally); Richards, supra note 6, at 47-14. Second, pre-grant substantive examination for petty patent applications is discretionary. See supra note 6.
82. Popularity here is measured by the number of applications filed. Recent figures indicate

that the number is extremely small: only 400 applications for petty patents were filed in 1994.
See Introduction of the Innovation Patent: Government Response to the Recommendations of the
Advisory Council on Industrial Property (ACIP) Report "Review of the Petty Patent System"
(visited Apr. 24, 1998) <http:llwww.ipaustralia.gov.aulnews/gresp.htrm>.
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C. CurrentInitiatives to ExpandSecond Tier PatentRegimes
Currently, initiatives to expand second tier patent regimes have
surfaced in both Europe and Australia. Both proposals feature bold
promises for second tier patent protection and deserve close and careful
scrutiny. Additionally, a variety of other proposals for second tier patent regimes, or close variations on those regimes, can be found in the
scholarly literature, particularly the literature on the "direct" protection of innovation. These proposals are briefly surveyed in this section.
1. Europe: Harmonized "Utility Model" Protection
The current European effort to legislate harmonized second tier patent protection is of relatively recent vintage, as European intellectual
property legislation goes, 83 although at least one call for harmonization
appears earlier in the scholarly literature. 84 Following the presentation
of proposals by the Max Planck Institute85 and other organizations,8 6
the European Commission released a consultative document (Green
Paper) in July, 1995, stressing the economic need for the expansion
87
and harmonization of second tier patent regimes across Europe.

83. See COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 3 (tracing the origins of the current European effort to
a 1994 FICPI petition to the European parliament and subsequent written questions from the
parliament to the Commission requesting that the Commission prepare proposals) (citing Action
Europeenne pour l'Education, l'Invention et l'Innovation, petition to the European Parliament, No.
1012/93; International Federation of Industrial Property Attorneys (FICPI), Resolution No. 6,
September 1994; and Written Questions Nos. 1552/94 and 2536/94, Hearing on the Petition to
the European Parliament, No. 10 12/93).
84. A leading early proponent of utility model harmonization was Professor Beier. See
Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Future of Intellectual Property in Europe, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 157, 166 (1991) (concluding that "[the introduction of national protection for
utility models to complement European patent protection... thus seems to me, at least for the
moment, to be the most appropriate solution...").
85. Proposalofthe Max Planck Institutefora European Utility Modl, 25 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT. L. 700 (1994), reviewed by Michael Kern, Towards a European Utility Mod, 25
INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT. L. 627 (1994) (commenting on the Max Planck proposal).
86. The Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Proprit6 Industrielle (AIPPI) debated, but never adopted, proposals for harmonization from the mid-1980s through the mid1990s. See Krasser, supra note 17, at 958-59.
Great Britain's Chartered Institute of Patents Agents [hereinafter CIPA] crafted proposals, although primarily in response to the threat that second tier protection might be imposed on the
United Kingdom by the European Commission. See MARGARET ILEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INSTITUTE, UTILITY MODELS/SECOND TIER PROTECTION: A REPORT ON THE PROPOSALS OF THE EUROPEAN COssanSSION 62-63 (1996) (expressing doubt that the CIPA proposals were inspired by any independent enthusiasm in the United Kingdom for second tier protection); Lees, Design Problems, supra note 54, at 226-28 (summarizing CIPA proposals).
87. The Green Paper's authors averred that "[a]s the single market is consolidated we can expect an increase in demand for utility models and especially in cross-border applications."
COM(95)370, supra note 20, at ii. To support the argument that empirical evidence counseled for
harmonized utility model protection, the Green Paper relied heavily upon surveys conducted by
the Ifo Institute (Ifo-InstitutfirW'irtschaftsforschung) to substantiate the proposition that the divergence in utility model regimes was sufficient to hinder economic progress. See id at 4, nn.16-17.
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European nations currently fall into one of four categories concerning second tier patent regimes. Some countries, including Germany,
have moved away from classical utility model regimes by dropping the
spatial form requirement and feature a "soft" obviousness standard. 8 A
second group of countries likewise refrains from the spatial form requirement, but, unlike the first group, uses a full obviousness/
inventive step criterion. These regimes thus differ from regular patent
protection primarily in that they have a shorter term.89 A third group
has retained the classical utility model regime, using both a spatial
form requirement and a soft obviousness standard. 90 Finally, in some
jurisdictions, most notably the United Kingdom, second tier patent
protection does not exist at all.
The Commission apparently perceived that consultation following
the Green Paper revealed "a real economic interest" in expanded second tier protection. 91 The European Community Council reportedly
took up the proposal for examination in February, 1998,92 and a direc-

tive could be adopted as early as 1999. 93
Harmonized utility model protection, as embodied in the White
Paper, blends elements of the reformed Gebrauchsmuster system with
selected innovations from the European Patent Convention 94 and the

Community Patent Convention. 95 In its broadest outlines, the White

The surveys have been sharply criticized in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., LLEWELYN, supra note
86,at 13-18.
88. See supraPart I.B.I.a for a discussion of current German law.
89. See also Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 45-46 (identifying the French certificatd'utilite, the
Dutch zesiarig octrool, and the Belgian brevet de courte
duree as representative of this "patent prototype" for
utility model systems in Europe).
90. Examples include the Greek utility model certificate, the Portugese modeo de utilidade, the
Italian brevetto per modelli de utilita, and the Spanish modeo de utilidad.See COM(95)370, supra note
20, at 7-8. Spanish law contains a representative spatial form requirement. In Spanish law, the
modelo de utilidadis defined as "an invention which consists of a form, structure or constitution
which results in a practical and appreciable advantage for its use or manufacture and in particular
utensils, instruments, tools, apparatus, devices or parts thereof." Suthersanen, supra note 10, at
46.
91. See Patrick Ravillard, The Proposalforan EU Directiveon Utility Models, in Proceedings of
the Sixth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Program VB
Part 1, pp. 5-6 (1998) (referring to the results ofconsultation with interested circles).
92. Seeid at 9.
93. See id. at 10.
94. Convention on the Grant of European Parents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter EPC], reprintedin GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM APP. 1 (1992).

95. Agreement Relating to Community Patents, Luxembourg, Dec. 15, 1989, Doc.
89/695/EEC; PATERSON, supra note 94, at App. 19 (providing full text of the Community Patent
Convention [hereinafter CPCI). For scholarly commentary on the CPC, see, e.g., John R. Thomas,
Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontie. Comparative Approaches to MultinationalPatent Enforcetent, 27
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 277, 298-99 (1996) (providing background on the CPC); AuIAzm
BENYAMi, PATENT INFRINGEmENT IN THE EUROPEAN CoiiuNusny 5-19 Wax Planck Inst. for
Foreign and Int'l Parent, Copyright & Competition Law ed., 1993) (providing a more extensive discussion of the background and issues surrounding creation of the CPC); STEPHEN P. LADAS, 1 PATENTrs,
ThADnMARKS, AND RE.ATED RIGHTS: NAT'L & INt'L PROTECnoN 684-701 (1975) (same).
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Paper proposal features provisions that typically characterize fullfledged second tier patent proposals: a short term (six years plus a pair
of two-year renewals),96 a limitation on the number of claims, 97 and a
lack of any pre-grant substantive examination. 98 Moreover, like the
reformed Gebrauchsmuster system, the White Paper dispenses with the
spatial form requirement. 99 The White Paper strikes out in new direc96. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 19; see also id. at Part Five (explaining Article 19).
The proposed term tracks the prevailing German standard. See BEIER, ET AL., supra note 63, at
I/B/209-210 (Sec. 23) (specifying that under current German law, the initial term of a utility
model is three years beginning on the day after the application is filed, extendable for three years,
and subsequently for two further terms of two years each). The term is generally consistent with
terms presently available under national laws in Europe. See Richards, supra note 6, at 47-13,
Table I (listing available terms). The White Paper term is, however, longer than the six-year term
allowed under Japanese utility model law. See Monya, supra note 50, at 253 (citing Utility Model
Law § 15 (1994)).
It is not, however, clear that the term proposed in the White Paper has any particularly sound
economic basis. The Economic and Social Committee recently observed that the "proposed duration of the protection appears excessive given the data the Commission provides on the life-cycle
July 1998 Opinion, sxpra note 20, at C235/29, Point 4.11 (commenting on
of inventions ....
Article 19). The Committee proposed the option of increasing the renewal fees starting after the
six-year period. See id. at 4.11.1.
97. The limitation, however, is qualitative: the number of claims "shall be limited to that
which is strictly necessary having regard to the nature of the invention." COM(97)691, supranote
20, at Art. 13(2); see also explanatory text for Art. 13(2), id. at Pt. 5.
This seemingly innocuous proposal may well give rise to costly ancillary litigation. The White
Paper leaves unclear whether Member States can implement the vague Article 13 standard by
limiting applicants to a specific number of claims, or whether Member States are obliged to adopt
the Article 13 standard word for word and tolerate the possibility that there will be extensive
third party opposition activity based upon an "excessive claiming" argument. July 1998 Opinion,
supranote 20, at C235129, Point 4.8 (noting additionally that the White Paper does not provide
for applicants to restrict voluntarily the number of claims).
98. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 15 (providing that pre-grant examination will be
limited to questions of compliance with formalities such as the submission of the required components of the application and will not include questions of compliance with novelty, inventive
step, and industrial application requirements). Article 15 appears to leave a gap regarding compliance with the limitations on eligible subject matter. It does not address whether the relevant
granting agency is to examine close questions on eligible subject matter or defer those to litigation in the interest of rapid issuance.
The Green Paper was slightly more forthcoming, seeming to contemplate at least a rudimentary examination for compliance with subject matter eligibility provisions:
In the scheme outlined here there would be no examination for novelty and inventive step.
But a check should at least be made to ensure that the formal conditions for protectabiliry
are satisfied. This would also eliminate inventions which are excluded from protectability by
the wording of the law.
COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 70. According to the Green Paper, current utility model systems
in Europe (except for Belgium) all feature this level of limited pre-grant examination. Id. at 70,
4
n.1 1; id at 59 (observing that all of the utility model systems recently introduced in Europe,
specifically in Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Austria, and the Netherlands, dispensed with pre-grant
substantive examination). Post-1994 Japanese law employs the same approach. See Jun Nakajima,
Revisions to the Japanese Utility Model Law, PATENT WoRLD 16, 17-18 (May 1994) (explaining
that the elimination of substantive pre-grant examination means that examination for compliance
with the subject matter provisions, unity of invention requirements, and, at least minimally,
disclosureldescription requirements is still carried out).
99. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 3(1) (providing that utility models will be granted
for "inventions"); id. at Arts. 3(2), 4 (including no language limiting the term "inventions" by
any spatial form requirement). In this regard, current proposals follow the lead of the Green
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tions, however, in its treatment of the scope of eligible subject matter
and the standard for inventiveness. 00
In Articles 3 and 4, the White Paper borrows heavily from the
European Patent Convention's approach to eligible subject matter, 10 1
but also engrafts some new and important limitations. Article 4(b)
expressly excludes inventions "relating to biological material,"' 02 while
Article 4(d) excludes inventions "involving computer programs," 10 3

Paper. COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 62-4 (arguing that the spatial form requirement is anachronistic); id. at 55 (concluding that due to the absence of other types of effective intellectual
property protection for functional aspects of articles, the concept of "invention" implying protection irrespective of spatial form should be used for any Community-level utility model), Sce also
id. at 56 ("The concept of invention is the only way of doing justice to this functional character.").
By way of justification, the White Paper merely advances the bald conclusion that "[the requirement that an invention must be embodied in three dimensional form ... has not been included as it does not correspond to present needs." COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Pt. 4, Subpart
A. Though the White Paper gives this issue little play, the fact is that many European jurisdictions still retain some form of the spatial form requirement, although it is not clear whether the
requirement would be vigorously enforced or whether it has been eroded in the manner that
arguably occurred in Germany and Japan. See supra note 20; see also Suthersanen, supranote 10, at
46 (listing European countries where utility model laws still include the spatial form requirement). Accordingly, on this basis alone, harmonization will cause a major change in several jurisdictions, converting their utility model laws into true second tier patent regimes.
By contrast, despite making major changes to other aspects of its utility model regime in
1994, Japan retained its spatial form requirement. See Nakajima, supranote 98, at 17. Article 1 of
the Japanese Utility Model Law provides that the law is designed for "promoting the protection
and utilisation of devices relating to the shape or construction of articles or a combination of
articles .. .". Id Accordingly, chemical structures and process inventions continue to fall outside
the protection of the utility model regime by failing to meet the spatial form requirement. Sce id
100. AIPPI identified these issues early on as the main obstacles to harmonization. See, e.g.,
Krasser, supra note 20, at 960. See also Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 45 (identifying subject
matter eligibility, especially regarding the spatial form requirement, and patentability as the key
areas of disparity in European standards).
101. Specifically, Article 3 closely tracks the language of Articles 52(1) and (2) of EPC, which,
among other things, exclude "discoveries" and mental steps from the definition of "invention."
COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 3. See also PATERSON, supra note 94, at 523. The utility
model proposal omits EPC Article 52(2)'s exclusion of computer programs, and instead deals
with computer programs in a separate exclusion. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
EPC Article 52(4) excludes certain surgical methods from protection because they do not meet
the industrial application requirement. See PATERSON, supra note 94, at 523 (text of EPC Article
52). The utility model proposal includes similar language in Article 7(2), which deals with the
industrial application requirement. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 7(2).
Finally, Article 4(a) of the utility model proposal includes a public policy limitation on eligible
subject matter that is nearly identical to the language of EPC Article 53(a). PATERSON, sepra note
94, at 523-24 (text of EPC Article 53); COM(97)691, supranote 20, at Art. 4(a).
102. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 4(b). See infra note 212 and accompanying text for
commentary on this exclusion.
103. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 4(d). The language used is unfortunate; nearly any
new electronic device probably "involves" a computer program. The exclusion seems a far cry
from merely excluding computer programs "as such," the effect of EPC Articles 52(2)(c) and
52(3). PATERSON, supra note 94, at 523. Interestingly, the EC's Economic and Social Committee
has recently opined that the Article 4(d) exclusion is "too broad" and should instead "be limited
to computer programs as such" in line with current European patent practice. July 1998 Opinion, O.J. C 235, supranote 20, at point 4.2.
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both potentially wide-ranging exclusions. 1°4 Article 4(c) takes an intermediate approach to the protectability of process inventions: chemithat
cal and pharmaceutical processes would be excluded, 10 5 implying
10 6
other types of processes would constitute eligible subject matter.
Regarding the standard for inventiveness, the White Paper proposes
a two-track inventive step standard under which the claimed subject
matter survives scrutiny if it exhibits either
(a) particular effectiveness in terms of, for example, ease of application or use; or
10 7
(b) a practical or industrial advantage.
This provision seems destined to cause more litigation than any other
aspect of harmonized utility model protection. 0 8
2. Australia: The Innovation Patent System
Australian efforts to transform the existing petty patent system into
an "innovation" patent system provide another example of the renewed
drive to expand second tier patent protection. 0 9 The proposed Australian system also deserves close attention because of its theoretical implications. 110
In February 1997, the Australian Minister for Science and Technology announced the creation of an "Innovation Patent System," a second-tier patent system aimed at "encouraging individuals and small to
medium-sized businesses to realise their good ideas.""' The system

104. See infra Part II.A.3 for an analysis of the proposed limitations on subject matter eligibility.
105. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 4(c). Utility model proponents, by contrast, had advocated that protection be extended to processes of all varieties. See Beier, supra note 84, at 166
(arguing for the elimination of the proscription against utility model protection for processes
"(t]his final relic of the last century" so that the utility model regime can "offer the European

inventor a comprehensive alternative to patent protection").
106. Commentary in the White Paper confirms this implication. See COM(97)691, supra note

20, at Part Four, Subpart A (explaining that the elimination of the spatial fbrm requirement

"makes it possible to bring processes within the scope of the proposal"). By contrast, second tier

regimes in Germany, Italy, and Spain all exclude processes from eligibility. See Kern, supra note
85, at 632. The same is true ofJapan where the spatial fbrm requirement remains. See Nakajima,
supra note 98, at 17 (explaining that due to the spatial form requirement "utility model applications directed towards methods and processes or invisible articles (e.g., crystal structure of metals,

chemical structures) cannot be registered").
107. COM(97)691, supra note 20, Art. 6.
108. I supply some reasons for this prediction infra Part III.B.
109. The proposed Australian Innovation Patent system is not entirely without precedent.
Current Malaysian law on "utility innovations" appears to take an approach quite similar to the

proposed Australian system. See Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 49 (describing Malaysian law).
110. I discuss theoretical implications in greater depth infra Part III.
111. <http:llwww.dist.gov.au/medialarchive/feb97141-97.html> (visited Apr. 27, 1998).
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resulted from a review of Australia's existing petty patent system by an
112
Advisory Council on Industrial Property (ACIP).
The innovation patent would, in some respects, constitute a more
vigorous form of petty patent: it would run for an eight-year term, 113
issue without any substantive examination,11 4 and be allowed to contain up to five claims without restriction on type.' 15 While the legal
scope of eligible subject matter will remain the same as for petty patents,11 6 the government intends to undertake a renewed effort to promote the innovation patent as a vehicle for protecting all varieties of
technologies. 117 Indeed, the use of the new, politically attractive label
"innovation patent" also reflects this ambition.' 8
The provision that perhaps most clearly differentiates the new Innovation Patent System from the existing petty patent system is the inventiveness provision. 1 9 While the prior art base would be expanded
to be the same as for regular patents, 120 the standard for inventiveness
112. Id. The government's proposal is named "Government Rresponse to the Recommendations of the Advisory Council on Industrial Property (ACIP) Report 'Review of the Petty Patent
System''. For the fill
text of the response, see <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.aulnews/gresp.htm>
(visited Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter "Government Response"].
113. Government Response,sgpra note 112, at Recommendation 4 (calling for a term of eight
years from the application date, but with a renewal fee due at the third anniversary of filing,
consistent with existing law for regular Australian patents). Accordingly, the innovation patent
offers a longer term than the existing petty patent regime. See supra note 76 (citing term provisions which govern the current petty patent system).
114. Government Response, supr4 note 112, at Recommendation 7. The Recommendation
provides that a "formal examination" will be undertaken for all innovation patent applications,
and that substantive examination will occur only upon request by either the applicant or a third
party. ACIP recommended that either the applicant or a third party could request substantive
examination any time within three years after filing, including examination prior to grant. The
government accepted the three year deadline for requests, but concluded that no substantive
examination would be available prior to grant, to avoid any delays. Id at Comment to Recommendation 7.
115. Id. at Recommendation 5 (explaining that there are no restrictions on whether the claims
are in independent or dependent form). The existing petty patent system permits no more than
three dependent claims. Id.at Comment to Recommendation 5.
116. The scope of eligible subject matter for innovation patents will be coextensive with the
scope of eligible subject matter for regular patents. See id. at Recommendation 9.
117. The government's report comments that although the government expects that innovation patent applications will mostly relate to "simple tools, utensils, machinery or equipment,"
the government does not propose to limit the scope of eligible subject matter because "limiting
the type or extent of technology coverage might preclude the innovation patent system from
covering new and emerging technologies." Id. at Comment to Recommendation 9.
118. See id. at Comment to Recommendation I (explaining that the government sought to
avoid the inherent negative connotations associated with the term "petty" patent). The report also
explains that using the term "utility model" for the new system was considered confusing "as this
term generally refers to mechanical and electrical inventions and excludes process and chemicalfbiochemical inventions." Id.
119. See Crinson, supra note 19, at 40-41 (suggesting that the main impetus for the proposed
Innovation Patent System derives from a desire to soften the inventiveness standard).
120. Government Response, supra note 112 at Comment to Recommendation 6 (elaborating
that the prior art base for innovation patents would, accordingly, include publications published
anywhere in the world). This differs quite dramatically from the existing petty patent system,
founded on archaic notions of the unavailability of foreign publications, under which only locally
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would be mote favorable to applicants. In particular, the system would
rely upon a "modified form of the expanded novelty test," 121 under
which protection would be withheld if the claimed invention varies
from previously publicly available articles, products or processes "only
to the effect of the
in ways which make no substantial contribution
22
product or working of the article or process."1
3. Scholarly Proposals
Scholars have periodically taken up the task of fashioning appropriate regimes for protecting subpatentable innovation 123 through what
may loosely be called "second tier" patent regimes. The proposals
range from radical suggestions to achieve "direct" protection of innovation, to more traditional formulations.
Some scholars have advocated the "direct" protection of innovation,
usually as a supplement to the regular patent system. 124 One proposal
would create an "innovation patent," 125 guided by the principle that
patent-like protection should be tied more closely to tangible manifestations of innovative activity.126 As one proponent puts it, "[p]rotection
a tangible object and the
would be granted only to the combination 2 of
1 7
initial act of actually commercialising it."'
The concern for actual commercialization (actually achieving the
"innovation object") dominates the substantive standards that characterize direct protection schemes. For example, the novelty standard

published information can qualify as prior art. See id. Prior use evidence would continue to be
limited to prior uses occurring in Australia. See id.
121. Id. at Comment to Recommendation 2. The expanded novelty test reportedly derives
from Griffin v. Isaacs, 12 A.L.J. 169 (1938). For a contemporary discussion of the substantial
novelty approach in Griffin v. Isaacs and the general difficulty of maintaining sharp distinctions
between novelty and nonobviousness as exemplified by evolving Australian regular patent jurisprudence, see, e.g., R. D. Werner & Co., Inc. v. Bailey Aluminum Prods. Pty. Ltd., 85 A.L.R. 679
(Fed. Ct. 1989).
122. Government Response, supra note 112, at Recommendation 2.
123. The issue of innovation protection sometimes manifests itself in unexpected ways. See,
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, PublicResearch and PrivateDevelopment: Patentsand Technology Transfer in
e.g.,
Government-Sponsored Research, 85 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1669-70 (1996) (suggesting that further
study of the role that patents play in inventions developed with the support of public funding
might be of broader theoretical interest if it reveals that patents stimulate downstream innovation
rather than simply providing incentives for the initial creation of inventions).
124. The arguments are pursued most completely in WILLiu. KINGSTON, DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION (1987) (see especially the "Thesis Chapters," at 35-86).
125. The proposal originated in Hermann Kronz, Patent Protectionfor Innovations: A ModelPart 1, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP.Rav. 178, 182 (1983). The label should not be confused with the
"innovation patent" of recent Australian proposals.
126. See id. at 181 (proposing that "innovation," for purposes of an innovation patent scheme,
be defined as "the factual combination of the applicable embodiment of the innovation object and
the first act of commercial use").
127. William Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants,in PATENTS IN PERSPECTIVE 68, 70
(Jeremy Phillips, ed., 1985) ("Anything new can be protected by an innovation patent, in the form
in which it actuallyenters into commercial activity.").
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would be narrowed dramatically; only a prior public use could anticipate. 128 Additionally, the disclosure would not be considered adequate
until it described a fully achieved innovation object. 129 Finally, in
keeping with the goal of protecting incremental innovation, the proposed innovation patent scheme would discard the inventive
step/obviousness criterion entirely, 130 thus going further than mainstream second tier patent proposals.
Another proposed form of "direct" protection of innovation, the
"innovation warrant," is similar to the innovation patent, but less obsessed with the actual existence of a commercial embodiment of the
invention. The innovation warrant is intended to protect investments
in innovative activity.131 That is, while the innovation patent offers
protection for anything new in the form in which it is actually commercialized, the innovation warrant supposedly would protect anything new "as long as it can be the subject of investment."' 132
Perhaps the most extraordinary features of the proposed direct protection schemes concern the term of protection, the enforcement of
rights, and the opportunities for third party challenges. Both the innovation patent and the innovation warrant would be granted for variable
terms of protection. 133 The proposals contemplate a complicated arrangement under which the term would be calculated as an inverse

128. The same considerations lead proponents to demand that the proposed novelty standard
would rest
on local novelty: "Known prior use must necessarily relate to domestic use because the
public interest in innovation in the respective geographical area is not served by prior use effected
in the area outside. Innovation protection is not concerned with the dissemination of technology
by words (information) but by action (innovation acts)." Kronz, supra note 125, at 181.
129. See Kingston, Innovation Patentsand Warrants,supra note 127, at 71-72. Kingston seems
to assume that by requiring an applicant to file "any appropriate piece of information, which
would then be progressively augmented by other items throughout the development stage," the
quality of the disclosure would far exceed that of regular patents. See id. at 72 (claiming that
"there would be no escape from disclosing 'know-how,' the absence of which from traditional
patent specifications is notorious"). Yet the apparent standard for adequacy of disclosure would be
no different from the enablement standard for regular patents. See id. at 71-72 (the disclosure
would have to be "so complete as really to permit the innovation to be copied as soon as its protection has expired"). This, coupled with the administratively complex notion of a successively
growing disclosure, raises considerable doubt as to whether the disclosures of innovation patents
would outdo their predecessors in the regular patent system.
130. See Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants, supra note 127, at 70; Kronz, supra note
125, at 182.
131. See Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants,supra note 127, at 73. Kingston points out
that while such a scheme seems radical in many ways, the general principle already has been
incorporated into at least one existing intellectual property regime, the European initiative for
protecting the contents of databases. See William Kingston, Patent Protectionfor Modrn Technologies, 1997 IreLL.PROP. Q. 350, 366, n.31 (citing the EC Directive on Databases, 1996 O.J. (L.
77)).
132. Id.
133. One scholar has similarly suggested that second tier protection is, in fAct,
a crude way to
approximate the ideal of customizing the term based upon the degree of inventiveness, by giving
incremental advances a shorter term and patentable inventions a relatively longer term. See Crinson, supra note 19, at 45.
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measure of the applicant's "innovative capacity" (for the innovation
patent) 134 or as a measure of the risk undertaken by applicant (for the
innovation warrant).' 35 As to enforcement, the innovation warrant
proposal goes so far as to advocate state enforcement of rights through
a specialized arbitration proceeding. 136 Finally, as to third party challenges, the proposals would diverge radically from long experience
with regular patent systems. In essence, the proposals would turn conventional wisdom on its head by allowing an opportunity for thirdparty oppositions prior to grant, 137 and by providing that granted innovation patents or warrants would immediately become incontest8
able.13
Other proposals would stop considerably short of a novelty-only
protection scheme coupled with an incontestable grant. John Richards,
for example, has suggested the possibility of establishing a noveltyonly scheme, but limited by a requirement that the owner grant compulsoty licenses after the expiration of a specified period. 139 Richards
has alternatively proposed relying upon copyright models, creating
140
liability only for "direct copying."
Other proposals are more focused on stimulating technological development under specialized circumstances. For example, Professor
Reichman has identified other varieties of second tier regimes that

134. Kingston, Innovation Patentsand Warrants,supra note 127, at 71.
135. See id. at 74-76 (describing how risk would be calculated). The system would use "categories" of risk, which would supposedly limit administrative discretion, although this seems a
highly dubious proposition given the sheer complexity of the calculation and the concomitant
multiple opportunities for variations in judgment. Id. at 69. See also Louis Kaplow, The PatentAntitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,97 HAtv. L. Rav. 1813, 1825, n.29 (1984) (describing an
economic calculus of optimal patent life including considerations of risk).
More radical yet are suggestions that the term could be used as a public policy instrument,
lengthened for areas of state interest (e.g., sectors in which unemployment is high) and presumably shortened for others. See id at 76. Quite apart from the array of legal and policy objections
that might be raised in connection with such a proposal, a mere glance at the existing U.S. provisions concerning term extension for pharmaceuticals should suffice to demonstrate that the administrative costs alone of such a scheme could be staggering. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1998). But see
Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants, supra note 127, at 76 (claiming that such a system
would be "costless to administer").
136. See Kingston, Innovation Patentsand Warrants,supra note 127, at 74.
137. Pre-grant oppositions were known in a variety of patent systems but have generally
proven unwieldy for all involved, especially applicants, and have largely been abandoned. See, e.g.,
Janis, supra note 60, at 28-33 (discussing the use of pre-grant oppositions in various European
national patent systems and objections to adopting pre-grant opposition procedures in the United
States).
138. See Kingston, Innovation Patents and Warrants, supra note 127, at 74. The proposal does
provide, at least, that grants could be challenged for procurement by fraud, notwithstanding
incontestability.
139. The specified period could encompass a predetermined time period, designed to represent
an appropriate "head start" time. Richards, supra note 6, at 47-11 to 47-12. Alternatively, the
specified period could be tied to a specified level of sales of the protected device. See id
140. Id. Richards questions whether a registration system would be needed if this were the
standard.
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have, at one time or another, been recommended as of interest for developing nations, including "patents of importation" and "industrial
development patents."' 41 While patents are customarily granted to the
first inventor, or the first inventor to file a patent application, patents
of "introduction" or "importation" are granted to the first actor to in-

troduce technology into a country.142 The opportunity to secure such

protection might typically arise where a technology has been patented

in a foreign country, but is neither patented nor being exploited in the
country in question. 143 Conceptually, this mechanism differs quite substantially from standard second tier patent regimes in that the patentee
of a patent of importation need not even be (and usually is not) the
true inventor of the patented technology. The TRIPS Agreement,
through its limitations on a country's authority to impose compulsory
licenses,144 restricts a country's ability to grant patents of importation,
but does not eliminate it entirely.145 Industrial development patents
46
are quite similar.
Yet other proposals would direct efforts at achieving technological
progress in specific technological sectors. One author, for example, has
proposed that Congress introduce an "environmental patent" that
would eliminate the obviousness requirement for product and process
inventions relating to environmental technologies, but would provide
only a ten-year term of protection. 147 The environmental patent would
be similar in its broad outlines to proposed second tier regimes, except
that all process inventions would constitute eligible subject matter,

141.
142.
143.
144.

Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 9, at 251-54.
Id. at 251, n.316 (collecting sources of scholarship on patents of importation).
Id. at 251.
A "working requirement" is a provision that provides for the loss of patent protection, or

the possibility that parent protection will be subject to compulsory licenses, where the patented
technology is not exploited ("worked") within the subject country.
145. As a result of the TRIPS provisions

[A] threat by government authorities to issue patents of introduction in the absence of local
working would no longer dissuade foreign patentees who had properly filed and obtained
domestic utility parents from supplying the market by imports alone, although such patentees would remain subject to compulsory licenses if they charged excessive prices for their
imports.
Id. at 252.
146. As Professor Reichman describes them:

Such patents can be granted to any persons or firms, whether foreigners or nationals, who
agree to establish operations in a developing country for the purpose of producing goods
that are neither patented nor manufactured there already or of employing technological processes that are neither patented nor already used in the country concerned.
Id. at 253 (proceeding to observe that an industrial development patent system dispenses with
traditional protectability requirements and looks instead to evidence that the applicant will make
a substantial investment in the local development of a given technology).

147. Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to Fosterthe Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Teehnologies, 20 HARv. ENVrL. L. RiV. 3, 14 (1996) (ritedin
Crinson, supranote 19, at 48).
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regardless of technical discipline. 148 Moreover, a number of scholars
have proposed second tier regimes or other intellectual property
schemes that aspire to provide adequate protection for computer software. 149 It takes little imagination to extend this reasoning to justify
the creation of a multitude of additional second tier patent regimes
having specialized subject matter requirements. 150 This squarely raises
the "legal hybrids" concerns that Professor Reichman has articulated in
several scholarly works. 151
II. SECOND TIER PATENT REGIMES AND GLOBAL PATENT
POLICY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
The drive to strengthen and harmonize second tier patent protection
152
in Europe has generated a spirited policy debate both within Europe
and elsewhere. 153 Two general rationales are of particular interest. First,
second tier patent protection is said to advance the interest in enhancing access to the patent system. Leaving aside for the moment the
critical normative question of whether enhanced access of the variety
154
promised by second tier protection makes any sense whatsoever,
thoughtful analysis reveals considerable doubts about whether second
tier protection can really hope to offer the enhanced access that its proponents promise. Second, the European initiative to harmonize second
tier patent protection might serve as a prototype for regular patent

148. Seeid. at 15-16.
149. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2413
(1994) (discussing a variety of approaches, including- a "market-preservation legal regime" that
would "provide a short period of blockage against cloning, and a system by which developers of
incrementally innovative software designs ... could register their innovations and make them
available for licensing"). See also infra note 205 (citing scholarly proposals for second tier regimes
especially designed for computer software).
150. To offer but a single example, scholars have recently discussed the possibility that the requirements in the Americans with Disabilities Act may have spurred the development of assistive
technologies. See Heidi M. Berven & Peter D. Blanck, The Economics ofthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct:
Part Th. Patents, Innoations andAssistive Tahnology, forthcoming, 12 NOTRE D~mE J.L. ETmI-cs & PuB.
POL'Y (1999) (citing evidence of increased patenting activities). If this is true, then by the same argument that supports creation of an environmental patent, one could call fbr the introduction of a regime
f&r "assistive technology parents."
151. See, eg., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 61, at 2503 (arguing that current legal hybrids such as utility models are "improvised responses to sectoral protectionist demands," which
"lack coherent theoretical foundations and reflect different economic premises."). See also infra
Part III.C.
152. In addition to the policy analysis provided in the Green Paper, COM(95)370, supra note
20, at 1-42, and the White Paper, COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Parts 1-3, recent scholarship
offering a policy discussion on various second tier patent proposals includes Kern, supra note 85
(supporting the Max Planck proposal), and L.LEwELYN, supra note 86, at 32-49 (criticizing the
Green Paper).
153. See, eg., Crinson, supra note 19, at 46-50 (focusing on the possible introduction of second
tier protection in Canada).
154. I take up that question in Part III.
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harmonization in Europe, which might in turn give impetus to global
harmonization. While the feasibility1 '5 of second tier harmonization as
a harmonization prototype cannot immediately be discounted, second
tier harmonization presents a real danger that resources will actually be
diverted away from regular patent harmonization.
A. Second Tier PatentProtectionand the Access Rationale
Classical utility model regimes came into being due in no small part
to concerns over access to the regular patent system. 156 Access continues as a dominant rationale underlying proposals for expanded second
tier patent protection. 157 Indeed, the dimensions of the access rationale
are probably much broader today, encompassing promises of enhanced
access to small and medium-sized business enterprises ("SMEs"), access
to products having short life cycles, and access for non-traditional
subject matters such as computer software and biotechnology products.

1. Access for Small Enterprises
Second tier patent protection, as envisioned in the EU's White Paper and in the proposed Australian Innovation Patent System, promises enhanced access to the patent system for small and medium-sized

enterprises. 158 This is to be achieved by eliminating pre-grant substantive examination (which is supposed to reduce costs to a level that fits
within the budgets of typical SMEs) and by relaxing the inventive step
standard (on the proposition that SMEs often do not innovate "to the
159
same level" as larger companies).
155. As with the access question, this analysis is restricted to feasibility, excluding from consideration the larger question of whether harmonization of substantive patent standards is desirable in the first instance.
156. Seesupra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (describing rationales motivating creation
of the U.K. Utility Designs Act of 1843).
157. Michael Crinson employs a similar label, "accessibility," to summarize a number of the
policy rationales that have been advanced to justify expanded second tier patent protection. Crinson, supra note 19, at 51.
158. See White Paper, COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Part Two (AX1) (stating that the proposed second tier system will benefit SMEs in Europe); Government Response, supra note 112 at
introductory text preceding recommendations (stating that the proposed Australian Innovation
Patent System will benefit SMEs in Australia). See also July 1998 Opinion, supra note 20, at
C235/30, Point 5.3 ("Utility models are the ideal mechanism to protect inventions which cannot
be patented. As such they represent a legal instrument particularly well-suited to SMEs."); Richards, supra note 6, at 47-4 to 47-5 (observing that one of the principal "philosophical" reasons
for adopting utility model protection generally is that it supposedly benefits the small scale innovator).

159. Philip Leith, Harmonisationof Intellectual Property in Europe: A Case Study of Patent Procedure, in 3 PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPER'Y 117-18 (Adrian Chandler, ed., 1998)

(reciting these strategies). The argument that the existing inventive step/obviousness standard
favors large entities (and that therefore the relaxation of the standard would benefit SMEs) rests
on assumptions about market power and about the level of innovation common to large entities.

1999 / Second Tier Patent Protection
At bottom, these strategies raise broad theoretical concerns that are
best dealt with separately. 160 But even assuming for the moment that
the protection of subpatentable innovation has a normative and economic basis, the proposition that second tier patent protection in fact
provides enhanced access for SMEs should be evaluated critically. The
claim could turn out to be of signal political importance in the United
States, particularly if pending patent reform legislation' 6l passes, given
that SMEs claim to be unfairly disadvantaged under the reforms and
may be quick to embrace second tier patent protection with its stated
pro-SME emphasis. The availability of harmonized second tier protection across the EU would give even further impetus to efforts to bring
second tier protection to the United States.
The question of whether second tier protection in fact offers enhanced access for SMEs may ultimately turn on empirical proofs. No
such proofs are necessary, however, to demonstrate the fundamental
flaws in typical claims of enhanced access appearing in the current literature.
Cost is no doubt the major obstacle impeding SMEs access to patent
systems worldwide. In addressing this concern, however, second tier
patent proposals focus strictly on the reduction of acquisition costs. It
seems quite safe to assume that second tier protection would certainly
be characterized by lower fees (filing fees, issuance fees, and postissuance maintenance fees). 162 In addition, by avoiding the creation of a
Kingston, for example, argues in representative fashion that the inventive step standard for regular patents forces incremental advances out of the patent system (because the advancements invariably do not rise to the level of an inventive step) and relegates them to "protection" purely by

market forces, like market power. William Kingston, Patent Protection for Modern Technologies,
1997 IrrELL. PROP. Q. 350, 360. Because larger firms are assumed to have superior market

power, incremental innovation will be dominated by large firms. See iadThis presages a lower
overall level of innovation, because large firms are assumed to carry out a lower level of innovation. See id.
The argument that direct protection schemes such as the "innovation patent" would benefit
SMEs draws in part from these arguments, because such schemes feature the abolition of the
inventive step/obviousness standard. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. In the main,

however, the argument that direct protection of innovation benefits SMEs follows a much different course. The innovation patent only offers protection where commercialization has been real-

ized, a capacity often lacking in independent inventors. Proponents of direct protection suggest
that independent inventors and SMEs nonetheless could enter into contractual arrangements with
larger firms, and that the granting authority, in recognition of such arrangements, would grant
the innovation patent jointly. See Kingston, Innovation Patentsand Warrants,supra note 127, at 71.
The term would be calculated as the average of what the large firm and the SME would each

receive on its own, a benefit to the large firm because the SME, possessing minimal "innovative
capacity," would qualify foran extensive term.
160. See infra Part III for an analysis of the theoretical implications of second tier patent re-

gimes.
161. Omnibus Patent Act of 1997, S. 507, 105th Cong.; 21st Century Patent System Im-

provement Act, H.R. 400, 105th Cong. (1997).
162. See, eg., Crinson, supra note 19, at 37 (offering the same prediction). These fees presumably could be manipulated in such a way that the promise of low-cost protection becomes a selffulfilling prophecy.

HarvardInternationalLaw Journal / Vol. 40

Community level right, the EU neatly avoids questions about the costs
of translations, another major component of costs for would-be patent
63
applicants.1
A number of questions should be raised about the proposition that
second tier protection brings reduced costs. First, looking strictly to
government fees, one should question the likely magnitude of the cost
reduction. National patent offices in Europe and the United States, as
well as the EPO, are embarking on cost reductions for the regular pat164
ent system even as the second tier proposals are being considered.
Claims that second tier protection offers generous reductions in fees
may prove to be seriously inflated.1 65
Perhaps more importantly, one may wonder why the problem of
burdensome costs for SMEs is best addressed via the indirect route of
creating an entirely new regime of rights which may or may not prove
more affordable to SMEs. Attacking costs of the regular patent system
directly might seem to be effort better spent. Indeed, U.S. law already
contains innovations which at least attempt to address the problem of
high acquisition costs. For example, "small entities" qualify for a fifty
percent reduction in regular patent fees. 166 While few would argue
that provisions such as this amount to a panacea for SMEs wishing to
participate in the patent system, they at least raise hope that acquisition costs can be made reasonable through direct means rather than
through the creation of an entirely new layer of intellectual property
rights.
Second, attorneys fees represent a substantial acquisition cost for
167
regular patents which dwarfs government fees in the ordinary case.
Given the substantive demands of the proposed second tier regimes for
adequate disclosure 68 and limitations on opportunities for post-grant
163. See I.LEWELYN, supra note 86, at 37 (pointing out that the Green Paper, which envisioned
the possibility of creating a Community-level utility model right, nonetheless sidestepped the
question of translation costs).
164. See supra note 4 (collecting reports on recent fee reductions in a number of key patent

offices).
165. See LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 35-36 (comparing fees at the U.K. Patent Office to
those at the European Patent Office). One EC official has acknowledged that second tier protec-

tion may be less attractive in the United States because the fee structure in the regular patent
system is less onerous for SMEs. See Patrick Ravillard, The Proposalfor an EU Dirctive on Utility
Models, in Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law
& Policy, Program VB Part 1, p. 4 n.2 (1998) (observing that the utility model might not be as
attractive in the United States because the United States features a "unitary patent system, no
translation costs (only one language), quick grant, special fees for SMEs (50 percent lower), etc."),
166. See 37 C.ER. § 1.9 (1998) (setting our relevant definitions); 37 C.ER. § 1.16-17 (1998)

(setting out the fee structure); 37 C.ER. § 1.27 (1998) (setting out procedures for claiming small
entity status).
167. Attorney fees may consume more than 50% of acquisition costs. See Crinson, supra note
19, at 37 (citing surveys).

168. Second tier patents would require a disclosure complying with the traditional requirements applicable to patent applications. See, e.g., White Paper, COM(97)691, supra note 20, at
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amendments, 169 there is every reason to believe that attorneys fees will
also represent a substantial acquisition cost in those regimes. Indeed,
there may be even a greater need for attorney expertise in the drafting
of second tier patent applications because, in the absence of substantive
examination, applicants may believe that only by placing a premium
licenon skillful drafting can they demonstrate reasonably to potential
170
rights.
enforceable
secures
patent
tier
second
the
that
sees
Arts. 8(l)(b) (requiring a description of the invention), 12 (requiring that the invention be disclosed "in a manner [that is] sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person
skilled in the art"), 13(1) (requiring claims to be "clear and concise" and "supported by the description."). Under U.S. regular patent law, the requirements are contained in the first paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994), which imposes three supposedly distinct requirements: the submission of an "enabling" disclosure, the disclosure of the "best mode" of carrying out the invention,
and the submission of a "written description" of the invention. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,
935 E2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (declaring that "35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
requires a 'written description of the invention' which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement" and whose purpose is "to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the
art that, as of the filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention." [italics
omitted]); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F13d 1043, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (contrasting the
enablement requirement, which "looks to the objective knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the
art," with the best mode requirement, which "looks to whether specific instrumentalities and
techniques have been developed by the inventor and known to him at the time of filing as the
best way of carrying out the invention.").
Recent litigation suggests that U.S. courts are scrutinizing the written description and enablement requirements more rigorously. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 E3d 1473,
1478-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that disclosure of a species of a mechanical invention does not
necessarily support a claim drawn to a genus under the written description requirement); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that disclosure of a species of a biotechnology invention does not necessarily support a claim drawn to a
genus under the written description requirement because nothing compels the conclusion "that a
description of a species always constitutes a description of a genus of which it is a part"); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 E3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that a disclosure
providing detail as to a species of a biotechnology invention does not necessarily support a claim
drawn to a genus under the enablement requirement; patent protection is not granted for "vague
intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable ....Tossing out the mere germ of
an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure.").
169. Rules limiting the second tier patent owner's right to amend the disclosure or claims
post-grant present a dilemma for second tier patent regimes. On the one hand, to preserve some
limited level of notice to the public, it would seem appropriate to place strict limitations on postgrant amendments. On the other hand, doing so places a premium on foresight in drafting, imposing up-front costs on applicants. Existing schemes show considerable disparity in their approaches to the problem of post-grant amendments. See, e.g., Nakajima, supra note 98 at 18-19
(reporting that Japanese utility models can be amended at any time prior to the reaching of a final
verdict in an invalidity trial, but the only allowable amendments after the utility model is registered are amendments deleting claims); cf.Australian Patents Act 1990, § 108 (offering a relatively liberal opportunity to amend petty patents post-grant to remove grounds on which the
petty patent would otherwise be invalid). Australian courts analyzing the validity of petty patent
claims often refer to the applicant's opportunity to amend. See, e.g., High Tech Auto Tools Pry.
Ltd. v. Ferochem Pry. Ltd., (1994) 29 I.P.R. 337 (referring to possibility of amending petty patent to overcome a general validity challenge based upon § 28(1)); Murray Joseph Wright v. Ajax
Davey Pry. Ltd., (1987) 9 I.P.R. 77 (referring to possibility of amending petty patent to overcome
a challenge for lack of clarity and fair basis under § 40); Re Application by Guertler, (1984) 4 I.P.R.
208 (giving applicant opportunity to amend petty patent claim "to encompass the features which
[patentee] has argued as being the features ofhis invention.").
170. See Crinson, supra note 19, at 38; Nakajima, supra note 98, at 20 (advising that Japanese
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Third, and most crucially for second tier patents as viewed from the
U.S. perspective, second tier patent regimes simply do not address the
most significant obstacle to SMEs access to the patent system: the cost
and complexity of enforcement of rights.17' It is commonly accepted
that enforcement cost is a major patent policy problem17 2 that is especially acute for SMEs. 173 Yet the proposed second tier patent regimes,
if anything, place the second tier patent owner in a far worse position
with regard to the cost of enforcing rights.
Fundamentally, because a second tier patent regime shifts responsibility for the determination of "soft" obviousness to the judicial process, each trial of a second tier patent, invariably involving an exhaustive validity attack, is potentially more complicated than a corresponding trial of a regular patent. 7 4 It also seems unlikely that any
responsible second tier regime would confer a statutory presumption of
validity on second tier patent owners, or impose an elevated standard
75
of proof for overcoming any such presumption. 1

utility models be drafted more carefully after the 1994 amendments limiting the opportunity to
amend the utility model post-grant).
171. Perhaps this is because utility model proponents have persisted in arguing that utility
models offer the promise of rapid enforcement. Se, eg., BEIER, supra note 63, at I/A/8 (arguing
that "[t]he quick enforceability of utility models is one of the great advantages of the German
utility model system . .. "). For a variety of reasons enumerated herein, the promise of rapid (and,
concomitantly, low-cost) enforceability of second tier patent rights should be evaluated critically,
especially when considered in the context of U.S.-style litigation.
172. For a U.S. perspective, see, e.g., ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW RnFoRMi, A
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 75-110 (1992) (noting that "one of the most

significant problems facing the United States patent system is the spiraling cost and complexity
associated with the enforcement of patent rights" and offering reform proposals).
173. For statistics on the cost of patent litigation in Europe generally, the United Kingdom
particularly, and the United States, see, e.g., Kingston, Patent Protection,supra note 159, at 359
(collecting authorities). For a frank, anecdotal account of the costs of patent litigation for small
enterprises, see Mary Baechler, Learningto Live with Patent Copycats, WALL ST.J., July 18, 1994, at
A12 (describing the "Patent Game" as being "like a game of chicken, where the winner is the one
who can spend the most without blinking, and even if you've won, you've spent months of your
life in boring depositions"). For a British perspective, see, e.g., An Exercise in Patents, ENGINEER
24 (June 5, 1998) (asserting that "[flor
the small, innovative engineering firm, protection of
intellectual property is a costly nightmare," and proceeding to report on the utility model directive as potentially "a more practical aid to small firms").
174. See, eg., Crinson, supra note 19, at 38 (suggesting that second tier patents may be more
frequently attacked by competitors than would be the case with regular patents). Infringement
trials of regular patents, at least in the United States, also routinely involve some challenge to
validity, but several fctors ordinarily limit the scope of the challenge. The existence of pre-grant
examination suggests that at least some validity issues will be aired fully before the PTO. Moreover, in the face of the statutory presumption of validity, patent challengers may choose to forego
marginal validity challenges. On the statutory presumption of validity, See generally 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (1997) (statutory presumption ofvalidity for patents); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 E2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that "the presumption remains intact
and on the challenger throughout the litigation...").
175. By contrast, challengers must present "clear and convincing" evidence as to underlying
facts
to overcome the statutory presumption of validity of a regular patent. See, e.g., Monarch
Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morar, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Worse yet, it seems improbable that a court operating under established principles of equity jurisprudence would be willing to grant
preliminary injunctive relief on a claim of alleged infringement of a
second tier patent. Federal Circuit jurisprudence requires a regular
patent owner to establish a likelihood of success on the merits on validity as part of the showing for preliminary injunctive relief, notwithstanding the presumption of validity. 76 Making such a showing for a
second tier patent would be extraordinarily difficult. 177 The virtual
elimination of temporary relief may be devastating to SMEs, who
might otherwise have turned to the preliminary injunction as a lowcost source of leverage in eventual settlement negotiations.
178
Second tier patent regimes generate inherently insecure rights,
and many of the difficulties that would plague owners of second tier

176. See, e.g., New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 E2d 878, 882-83 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (preliminary injunction movant must show, in light of the presumptions and burdens
that will inhere at trial on the merits, that movant's claim will survive nonmovant's validity
challenge). See also Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 E3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (if the
nonmovant raises "a 'substantial question' concerning validity ...the preliminary injunction
should not issue.").
177. Experience with petty patents in Australia may demonstrate as much. For example, in
Peter Pan Electrics Pty. Ltd. v. Newton Grace Pry. Ltd. (1985) 70 A.L.R. 731 (Austl.), the owner
of a petty patent sought an interlocutory injunction against alleged infringement of the petty
patent. Analyzing the balance of convenience, the court pointed out that "petty patent applications are not necessarily subject to a rigorous search before grant and to that extent the public
interest and the interest of potential infringers have not been safeguarded to the same extent as
they are in the case of standard patents." Peter Pan (1985) 70 A.L.R. at 742. This observation
weighed heavily in the court's decision that the balance of convenience cut against the grant of
interlocutory relief.
178. See, eg., Richards, supranote 6, at 47-8 (noting that second tier protection implicates the
tensions between fairness and certainty, in that fairness considerations might counsel in favor of
extending second tier patent protection to "small innovators," but the inherent uncertainties of
second tier protection for marketplace participants may counsel against creating such a regime).
See also id. at 47-4 (acknowledging the argument that the softened inventive step standard, coupled with the lack ofpre-grant substantive examination, yields insecure rights and leads to uncertainty and economic inefficiency).
The Green Paper turns this argument on itshead by offering uncertainty as a positive
justification for adopting such second tier regimes. The Green Paper acknowledges the argument
that a second tier patent system "might leave firms unsure of their legal position, since it would
produce large numbers of registered but untested rights which conferred no definitive entitlement on the holder or anyone else." COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 56 (reporting on a U.K.
study which laid out the uncertainty argument). But, according to the Green Paper authors,
"1there is no reason to expect a flood of untested rights in a system of registration" because "[in
Member States which already possess such a system there is an equilibrium between utility models and patents: the absence of prior examination means that the legal certainty conferred by a
utility model is limited, so that a patent will often provide more effective protection." This is a
convoluted and ironic argument for justifying the introduction of broader second tier protection.
It also ignores the fact that until recently, national systems took the form of classical utility
model regimes, not full-fledged second tier patent regimes as offered in present proposals. See
supra Part I (analyzing the differences). For a similar argument that ignores conceptual distinctions in the types of second tier systems, see COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 58 (arguing that
dispensing with pre-grant substantive examination is preferred, because "ft]he many years of
positive experience built up in the countries which possess this form of protection show that the
lower degree of legal certainty has no great practical repercussions.") (Citing 21 INDus. PROP. 9
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patents in attempting to enforce their rights can be attributed to the
inherent uncertainties of second tier protection. 79 There are legislative
fixes, but they run squarely contrary to the goal of enhancing access for
SMEs that have limited litigation budgets. For example, the proposed
Australian Innovation Patent System would require the owner of an
innovation patent to request substantive examination from the Australian patent office, and await its completion, prior to initiating or
even threatening an infringement action. 180 This requirement places
(1992)).
179. Such problems would be particularly acute in enforcement of"innovation warrants." The
scope of warrants would be determined by a so-called "whole information contents" approach, in
which the warrant-holder would apparently have free rein to redefine the scope of protection to
encompass any "new information contained in the product," apparently even if undisclosed in the
warrant document. Kingston, Innovation Patentsand Warrants,supra note 127, at 76. It is difficult
to imagine how such a system could be rationally administered in enforcement proceedings, or
how competitors in the marketplace could possibly be expected to plan their behavior to avoid
infringement.
180. Government Response, supra note 112, at text accompanying Recommendation 7; see also
Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 49 (confirming this observation). The French certificat d'utilit6 system, a short-term patent system providing no pre-grant substantive examination, has featured a
similar provision for some time. See Krasser, supra note 17, at 951; Patent Law of France, Art. 93
(translatedin SiNNorr, supra note 51, at FIANcE 90.39-.40).
Japanese utility model law, as amended in 1994 to eliminate pre-grant substantive examination, also contains a compulsory report provision. See Nakajima, stpra note 98, at 18-19 (relating
that under the 1994 amendments, a utility model owner must provide notification to the alleged
infringer in the form of a warning letter and a technical evaluation report procured from the JPO,
where the evaluation report entails a substantive examination carried out by the examiner extending to documentary sources of prior art). Interestingly, Mr. Nakajima advises applicants to
request a technical evaluation report immediately upon the filing of any important utility model,
but warns that the results of such a report may not be available very rapidly. See id. at 20. This
starkly illustrates the point that promise of quick, low-cost issuance beneficial to SMEs is illusory
if applicants will request substantive examination as a practical matter before a patent is granted
for subject matter that they deem important,
The proposed harmonized European regime would leave to member states the critical decision
as to whether to require the second tier patent owner to request substantive examination prior to
initiating infringement proceedings. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 16(4) ("In the provisions they adopted in order to comply with this Directive, Member States may provide that a
search report is compulsory in the event of legal proceedings being brought to enforce the rights
conferred by the utility model."). The Economic and Social Committee has recommended that
Member States implement such compulsory provisions. See July 1998 Opinion, supra note 20, at
C235/29, Point 4.9.1. But ef COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 74-5 (proposing that the issue of
securing a search report in an enforcement proceeding be left to the court's discretion in each
case).
In certain circumstances, second tier patent owners may wish to initiate substantive examination themselves, possibly even prior to grant. The European proposal would allow applicants to
request a prior art search report. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 16(1). But seeJuly 1998
Opinion, supra note 20, at C235/29, Point 4.9 (recommending that the applicant's ability to
request a search report be limited to exceptional circumstances to preserve the viability of the
second tier system, and expressing concern that search report requests will be used "only by the
most economically powerful applicants"). See also COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 71 (reporting
survey results that supposedly suggested a "largely positive assessment" in response to questions
about whether utility model applicants should have the option to request prior art searches).
It does not appear that the Australian system will allow applicants to initiate substantive examination prior to grant. See Government Response, supra note 112, at text accompanying Recommendation 7 (explaining government's rejection-in-part of the recommendation that appli-
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the second tier patent owner in a worse position than a regular patent
owner in seeking a rapid judicial intervention.'" Likewise, second tier
proposals envision subjecting second tier patents to administrative
revocation.' 8 2 Because third parties can participate fully in such proceedings, they are generally much more costly and complex than ex
parte examination, again suggesting that the second tier patent owner
is actually in a worse position than the corresponding applicant for a
83
regular patent. 1
Proposals for second tier patent regimes simply fail to address the
crucial problems concerning enforcement of rights. For example, the
Australian government's report on the Innovation Patent System proposal observes that
There are clear indications that for the innovation patent system
to be attractive to users it must encompass provisions for a less
costly and more timely means for enforcing innovation patent
rights. However, because the channels for enforcement of innovation patent rights form part of the existing adversarial system
there are inherent difficulties in proposing discrete and workable
84
solutions.1
The government goes on to raise the possibility of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms being used ("low cost non judicial alternatives"), in a manner that seems more akin to vague hope than a concrete, workable proposal.' 8 5
cants be allowed to initiate substantive examination any time within three years of filing).
181. On the other hand, it arguably presents efficiency benefits from a societal perspective in
that the market decides which applications are eventually subjected to thorough examination and
which are not.
182. See, ag., COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 24 (and accompanying commentary, relat-

ing that the revocation provision is modeled after Article 56 of the Community Patent Convention). For an overview of administrative revocation proceedings, see Janis, supra note 60, at 99111.

From the U.S. perspective, this presents yet another implementation problem, because the
United States currently lacks the administrative apparatus to conduct administrative revocation
proceedings.
183. See, e.g., Liesegang, supra note 43, at 7 (describing administrative "cancellation" proce-

dures under the German utility model system). In most such jurisdictions, a regular patent owner
could eventually be subjected to a post-grant cancellation proceeding.
184. Government Response, supra note 112, at text accompanying Recommendation 13 (asserting that "[t]he problem of providing an avenue forenforcement of innovation patent rights at
a level lower than that of the Federal Court and the Supreme Courts be acknowledged as requiring serious and urgent attention"). Moreover, the proposition that a cost-effective patent ADR

mechanism could actually be created is certainly not free from controversy.
185. There may be a silver lining. If, indeed, a second tier patent regime generates innovative
proposals for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms that would satisfactorily handle
complex patent disputes, the benefits would be substantial, assuming that the lessons learned
thereby could be applied to the litigation of regular patents. Again, however, directly addressing
the problem by encouraging usage of new ADR approaches in regular patent disputes seems

likely to be more fruitful. Moreover, the proposition that a cost-effective patent ADR mechanism
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A fourth major failing endemic to second tier proposals is the characteristic omission of any consideration of another category of downstream costs that might be labeled "clearance" costs. By clearance costs
I refer to all the costs of doing business in an environment in which
others own second tier patent rights. It would be easy, perhaps, for an
SME seduced by the promise of a new form of intellectual property
rights to forget that others will also be eligible to own such rights and
to enforce them.
In a regular patent system, all users partially subsidize the cost of
clearance by paying fees to the examining agency and receiving a substantive examination prior to the grant of patent protection. By contrast, in a second tier patent regime without pre-grant substantive examination, the responsibility for applying the substantive standards of
patentability is shifted to the judiciary, and the costs are correspondingly borne by the litigants. In practical terms, the result is that private actors will more frequently face the need to procure clearance
opinions to ensure that their proposed activities do not infringe valid
second tier patent rights. Those clearance opinions will unquestionably
be highly complex, given the elusive nature of the relaxed inventive
step standard. This could translate to greatly increased costs of doing
business for all enterprises in a given area of technology, and SMEs are
presumably least well-positioned to handle such costs.18 6 Another possibility is that private actors will routinely find it necessary to initiate
administrative revocation proceedings. Experience with post-grant
opposition in Europe may indicate that the costs of such procedures
18 7
will be significant.
Finally, nothing in the existing second tier proposals, or in current
utility model systems precludes large entities from securing second tier
patent rights as an independent form of protection as a means for establishing priority and gaining temporary protection during pendency
of a regular patent application, 8 8 or as a second line of protection in

could actually be created in any event is not free from controversy.
186. See,e.g., Leith, supra note 159, at 119 (asserting that in the absence of substantive exami-

nation, manufacturers will have to analyze validity themselves, making their task more difficult).
187. Provisions compelling second tier patent owners to initiate substantive examination prior
to enforcing second tier patent rights would not alleviate the problem. An actor in the marketplace routinely would have to assess the validity and scope of second tier patent protection before

the commencement or threat of any enforcement action, and hence, before the second tier patent
owner was compelled to procure a technical evaluation report or initiate substantive examination.
188. For example, large firms might use the second tier patent as temporary protection during

pendency of a regular patent application directed to the same invention. See, e.g., Kern, supra note
85, at 629 (adverting to the possibility that large firms would employ the second tier patent as
"makeshift protection" or a "quick weapon" while regular patent prosecution was ongoing);
Hausser, srpra note 44, at 316-17 (noting that utility model applications are frequently used as

"place-holders" for regular patent applications). The White Paper includes provisions confirming
Paris Convention priority and establishing internal priority. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at
Art. 17 (providing that a utility model can serve as a Paris Convention priority filing for a regular
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addition to regular patent protection. 189 Here again, there is vast potential for SMEs to come out on the short end. 190 Large entities, if so
inclined, might well possess the wherewithal to "flood" a promising
area of technology with an array of second tier patent applications,
presenting a significant impediment to SMEs attempting to enter the
market, 19' and may rely on superior resources to control enforcement
patent application, and vice versa); See id. at Art. 18 (providing that a patent application can serve
as a priority filing for a utility model application filed within twelve months and directed to the
same invention). Similar requirements exist in current German utility model law. See Utility
Model Act §§ 5-6 (translatedin BEIER, supra note 63, at /B/203); see also Liesegang, supra note
43, at 5-9 (discussing the benefits of "branching off' a utility model from a patent application).
For the proposed Australian approach, see Government Response, supra note 112, at Recommendation 10 (proposing rules on priority, divisionals, and convertibility of an innovation patent
application to a standard patent application).
189. The White Paper seems to leave open the possibility of dual protection of the same subject matter by both regular and second tier patents. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 22(1)
("The same invention may form the subject matter, simultaneously or successively, of a patent
application and a utility model application."); id.at commentary on Art. 22 ("Such dual protection is worthwhile where the user wishes to obtain temporary protection pending the grant of a
patent, where he is not sure that the inventive step is sufficient for a patent, or where he wishes to
be particularly well protected by two different systems for the same invention."). The White
Paper does provide that Member States can. legislate that a granted utility model is "deemed
ineffective" where a patent is granted to the same invention, see id. at Art. 22(2), or, in the alternative, should take "appropriate measures" to ensure that rights holders do not institute "successive proceedings under both sets of protection arrangements." Id. at Art. 22(3).
The Economic and Social Committee takes a dim view of proposed Article 22. See July 1998
Opinion, supra note 20, at C235/30, Point 4.14 (arguing that Member States should be compelled to deem utility model protection "ineffective" where a patent has been granted for the
same invention). Even under this proposal, the relevant decisionmaker would be required to
undertake a claim-to-claim comparison, an analysis that has proven particularly trying in double
patenting disputes in the United States. See, eg., General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft
Kohle MbH, 972 E2d 1272, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing the law of double patenting).
The Australian Government has rejected the recommendation that dual protection be allowed
under the proposed Innovation Patent System. Government Response, supra note 112, at Recommendation 11. The Government reasoned that
allowing applicants to hold standard and innovationpatent rights would be a form of doubledipping that would not be in the national interest. This is because an innovationpatent can
have a wider scope than a standard patent, as its inventive threshold is lower. Having simultaneous protection under both systems would allow firms with inventions meeting the standard patent threshold to have a 20 year protection period that would be enhanced during
the first 8 years by the innovation patent ....This would serve to limit the options for inventing around the invention and would provide a stronger form of protection than either
individually .... [This is against the national interest, especially as dual protection is
likely to be sought mainly by large foreign companies.
Id. at text accompanying Recommendation 11. Japanese law also currently disallows dual protection. See Crinson, supra note 19, at 28.
190. See, e.g., LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 24-5 (asserting that large entities may be more
adept at securing intellectual property rights and may react more quickly than SMEs if second
tier patent rights become available); see id. at 108 (arguing that experience with the Australian
petty patent system demonstrates that large companies will be quick to secure second tier rights).
191. See id.at 108 (arguing that second tier patent rights held by large entities could present a
barrier to entry by SMEs). See also Joanna Schmidt, EC Considers Protectionsfor Utility Models, IP
WORLDWIDE (May/June 1996) (visited Mar. 20, 1997) <http:/Iwww.ipww.comlmay96/p2Oec.
html> (commenting critically on the Green Paper proposals and predicting that as a result of the
lowered inventive step standard, "the technical domain will be jammed with monopolies based
on unexamined claims relating to minor technology. It is doubtful whether this would be a posi-
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proceedings. 192 Indeed, the prospect of vigorous participation across
the board in the acquisition of rights in subpatentable innovation also
raises very serious concerns from a social utility perspective. 93 Property theory predicts the possibility that, rather than promoting technological progress, a second tier patent regime might actually retard
194
technological progress by creating "anticommons" property.
2. Access for Inventions Having Short Life Cycles
Second tier patent proposals also routinely promise to provide
"quick" protection that is effective in securing intellectual property
rights for products having life cycles shorter than the average pendency
of a regular patent application. 195 This is a particularly important
justification for second tier patent protection because, if it is true that
products across the board are experiencing steadily diminishing life
cycles, 96 it is possible that second tier protection may be viewed as the
dominant regime for the protection of technology. 197 Additionally, the
possibility of quickly acquiring protection may be especially critical to
small technology companies whose major assets comprise intellectual
property rights. One commentator, for example, points out that second
tier patents may provide small companies with the security necessary

tive development for European IP law.").
192. See LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 110 (asserting that second tier patents, by their nature,
are likely to generate more litigation than regular patents, and that large entities are likely to
possess advantages in any such litigation by virtue of their superior resources and expertise).
193. Some commentators have acknowledged the argument, although without exploring fully
the theoretical basis in property theory and economics. See, e.g., Leith, supra note 159, at 118
(reporting the argument that utility models "would simply make the task of the manufacturer
more difficult: there would be a 'minefield' of utility models which might explode at any point in
a manufacturer's operation."). But c.Kronz, supra note 125, at 182 (claiming that in the context
of direct protection schemes such as the "innovation patent," the abolition of the inventive step
requirement will not lead to a "flood of inferior patents" because the requirement of actual commercial activity would significantly limit the number of potential grants).
194. See infra Part III.A for an analysis.
195. See, e.g., COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Parr Two (A)(1). The Australian government has
established the same goal for the Innovation Patent System. See, e.g., Government Response, supra
note 112, at text accompanying Recommendation 7 ("Applicants will be granted an innovation
patent after IP Australia has completed the formality examination of their application and the
applicants have paid the appropriate fees. A grant under these conditions will provide the patentee with a right that is quick and cheap to obtain ... "). The Australian recommendation on
publication of the application three months after filing gives another indication of the speed with
which innovation parents are expected to issue. See id. at text accompanying Recommendation 8
(stating that "innovation patents should be published as soon as IP Australia has completed the
formality examination. This will occur as soon as possible and not later than three months after
filing.").
196. See COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 24-28 (offering empirical evidence in support of the
claim that product life cycles are growing shorter, and arguing that the need for expanded opportunities for second tier patent protection corresponds with this trend).
197. See LLEWELYN, supranote 86, at 49 (offering this prediction).
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Ultimately, however, many of the same considerations that undermine the goal of providing low cost protection through second tier
regimes likewise undermine the goal of providing quick protection.
Regimes which have sought to offer rapid issuance by abolishing pregrant substantive examination, routinely provide that substantive examination, with its inevitable delays, must be requested prior to enforcement. 199 Post-grant administrative revocation procedures are
likely to be available, and parties charged with infringement of second
tier patent rights could presumably initiate a revocation proceeding
and demand suspension of the infringement proceeding pending the
outcome of the revocation. 200 Serious questions may be raised as to
whether second tier patent regimes, as currently formulated in existing
proposals, would be capable of providing 20"quick" protection in any
commercially meaningful sense of the word. '
Here again, directly addressing the problem of improving the speed
of issuance of patents from the regular patent system seems immeasurably more attractive than creating an entirely new system of intellectual property rights. Recent initiatives along these lines are showing
promise. The U.K. Patent Office, for example, has implemented a
"fast-track" procedure for regular patents which reportedly is facilitating the issuance of regular patents, after full examination, in less
than twelve months. 20 2 United States patent regulations currently pro198. Crinson, supranote 19, at 51,argues that:
While the cost advantage of protecting one's innovation may be marginal under second tier
protection rather than patent, there is a significant advantage to second tier protection in
terms of the cost of invention. An enterprise with a research goal can make incremental advances, and a reward after each incremental advance may be critical for financing the next
step. Second tier protection provides this opportunity for this intermediate financing that
under a patent system may be lacking.
This presumes a regime that is sufficiently certain that markets are able and willing to assign
value to second tier patent rights. For reasons already enumerated and to be explored in Part III,
second tier rights may be so uncertain that the extent to which the rights would enhance the
security ofa company's intellectual property portfolio may be questioned.
199. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Nakajima, supra note 98, at 19 (describing the Japanese practice under which an
infringement proceeding will be suspended pending the outcome of a validity "trial"). See also
Monya, supra note 50, at 230, note 10 (noting that "trial" in this context refers to an administrative proceeding before the Japan Patent Office). Stays of enforcement proceedings, pending the
outcome of administrative proceedings concerning patent validity, are already well-known in
United States patent law. See Janis, supra note 60, at 78-81 (describing the practice of staying
infringement suits pending the outcome of reexamination proceedings).
201. It could be argued that an early indication of rights (via issuance of a second tier patent)
is better than no indication of rights, even if the early indication is, highly speculative. Considered in isolation, this may or may not be the case. Considered in connection with the multiplicity
of additional costs that second tier patent protection imposes, it seems unlikely that the attenuated benefits that might flow from an early, tentative indication of rights would be worthwhile.
202. See Lees, Design Problems, supra note 54, at 225 ("As to speed and costs, it would be hard
for any system to beat the fast-track procedure now available in the U.K. Patent Office with full
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vide that applicants can obtain accelerated examination under specified
circumstances by making the requisite showing in a "petition to make
special." 20 3 In addition, applicants can now obtain a filing date in relatively rapid order by filing provisional applications, followed within a
year by full-fledged applications.204 The conceptual simplicity of these
solutions as compared to second tier patent regimes suggest that even
moderately effective direct solutions should be favored over second tier
rights for securing meaningful patent protection for products with
very short life cycles.
3. Access for Nontraditional Subject Matter
Another intriguing rationale for second tier patent protection is that
it may provide a conceptual framework for the creation of intellectual
property regimes devoted specifically to the protection of nontraditional technological subject matter. For example, commentators have
suggested that a second tier patent regime be created expressly for the
protection of computer software, 20 5 avoiding the extensive debates
about the outer parameters of traditional subject matter eligibility
provisions in the regular patent systems. Others have observed that
second tier patent protection might be viewed as an attractive mechaexamination for inventive step, whereby a patent can be obtained in under 12 months."); Crinson,
supranote 19, at 38-39 (questioning whether the time savings afforded by second tier protection
is really very significant as compared to fast-track patent issuance as currently being practiced in
the U.K. Patent Office). See also Richards, supra note 6, at 47-8 (noting the argument that most
patent offices, including the EPO, have mechanisms for expediting prosecution),
Additionally, in connection with its advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in support of a
series of "Patent Business Goals," the United States Patent and Trademark Office has recently
announced that it will seek to reduce patent application "processing" time (defined as the time
that the PTO spends processing an application, not including time periods in which the PTO is
awaiting action by applicant) to twelve months by the year 2003. See Advanced Notice of Rulcmaking Is Issuedfor Patent Business Goals, 56 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT. J. (BNA), 647 (Oct. 8,

1998).
203. See 37 C.ER. § 1.102(c)-(d) (1998) (authorizing petitions to make an application special); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (6th
ed., rev. 3) § 708.02 (1998) (describing a variety of grounds for petitions to make special).

204. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1995) (authorizing the filing of provisional applications). This
may be especially attractive to applicants dealing in rapidly evolving areas of technology, or applicants who, for a variety of reasons, need to file rapidly. Charles A. Eldering, John P. Blasko, &
Abbe E.L. Brown, ComparativeAnalysis of ProvisionalPatentApplications Under U.S. and U.K. Law,

79 J.PAT. TM. OFF.Soc'y 791, 793 (1997) CA key advantage of the provisional patent application in industries with rapidly changing technologies and short product cycles is the ability to
obtain a filing date, and thus a constructive reduction to practice, of the invention described in
the application.").
205. See, ag., Mark Aaron Paley, A Model Software Petite PatentAct, 12 SANTA CLARA COMP. &
HIGH TECH.L.J. 301 (1996); Richard H. Stern, A Sui Generis Utility ,Model Law as an Alternative
Legal Model for Protecting Software, 1 U. BAIT. INTELL. PROP. .J.108 (1993); Takahuru Higa-

shima & Kenji Ushiku, A New Means of InternationalProtection of Computer Programs Through the
Paris Convention-A New Concept of Utility Model, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 1 (1986); Robert P. Sabath,
Note, Petty Patents in the FederalRepublic of Germany: A Solution to the Problem of Computer Software
Protection?,8 Sw. U. L.REv. 888 (1976).
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nism for protecting biotechnological inventions that lie at the margins
of traditional utility/industrial applicability requirements, such as the
results of genomic mapping endeavors, including the Human Genome
20 6
Project.
In a sense, these proposals are less radical than they seem at first
glance. Certainly the conceptualization of second tier regimes as gapfillers has precedent, given that classical utility model regimes were
perceived as gap-fillers. 20 7 In addition, U.S. law already has experimented with sui generis intellectual property rights for semiconductor
chip masks, 208 although experience with the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) is so limited that few conclusions can yet be drawn
from it.209

The current European proposal for second tier patent protection,
however, makes no real effort to embrace non-traditional subject matters or to spur the development of creative provisions for handling

206. See LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 83-104 (extensively discussing the prospect of extending second tier protection to biotechnological inventions). For a scholarly exchange on the application of the utility requirement under U.S. patent law to claims to expressed sequence tags
(ESTs) arising from the Human Genome Project, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert R Merges,
Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identication of Partial
cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1995); Scott A. Chambers, Comments on the Patentability of
Certain Inventions Associated with the Identi.ication of PartialcDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA QJ. 53
(1995); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert R Merges, Reply to Comments on the Patentabilityof Certain
Inventions Associatedwith the Identifiation of PartialcDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA QJ. 61 (1995). The
United States Patent and Trademark Office's position on the utility requirement, especially as
applied to biotechnology inventions, can be found in PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed.
Reg. 36, 263 (1995).
207. Seessupra notes 26-30 and 78-79 and accompanying text.
208. At least one commentator has pointed out that chip design protection might be viewed
as a "new type of utility model protection." Charles R. McManis, Taking Trips on the Information
Superhighway: InternationalIntellectual PropertyProtectionand Emerging Computer Technology, 41 ViL.
L. Ray. 207, 259 (1996) (pointing out that a consequence of such an argument would be to
subject chip design protection to the Paris Convention's national treatment requirements). For
general background on the SCPA, see, e.g., RICHARD H. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION (1986); DAVID LADD, DAVID E. .EIBowrrz, & BRUCE G. JOSEPH, PROTECTION FOR
SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP M.ASKS IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR
CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF 1984 (1986); THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF
1984 (Gary Rinkerman ed., 1985); Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct of 1984: Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417 (1985). The
legislative history has been collected in BERNARD REAMS, THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP AND THE
LAW : A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF 1984
(1986).
Professor Stern views the SCPA as a possible "model for fiture systems of protection of new
technology." STERN at 448. Stem's list of salient characteristics of such a model coincides roughly
with the features of typical second tier patent regimes. See id. (identifying characteristics such as
"[a] low standard of novelty or creativity, relative to patent law, but a higher standard than that of
copyright law ...[a] registration, rather than examination, system; a faster, less formal, cheaper
system than patents [and] ....Novelty tested in the courts, not by the agency doing the registration.").
209. For example, there is currently only a single appellate level decision on the SCPA. See
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 E2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The apparently modest level of use might itself raise questions about the benefits of the SCPA.

HarvardInternationalLaw Journal / Vol. 40
those subject matters. For example, the European White Paper expressly excludes "inventions involving computer programs" from the
scope of eligible subject matter, 210 no doubt in an effort to avoid the
uncertainties of European regular patent law concerning the patent
eligibility of computer software.2 11 The White Paper takes a similar
approach for biotechnology inventions. 212 The Australian proposal, in
210. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 4(d). In this respect, the White Paper proposal is
arguably a step backwards from some existing national regimes. For example, the 1994 Austrian
Utility Model Law provides that the range of eligible subject matter includes "[pIrogram logic
that is the basis of programs for data processing systems .... Austrian Utility Model Law § 1(2)
(1994); Jurgen Betten, Patentabilityof Software in Europe: The German Perspective(PartI), 13 CoMtPUTER LAW. 16, 20 (No. 9) (Sept. 1996). Betten asserts that this provision would countenance
claims directed to the "solution embodied in the program logic." Id. at 20, note 32 (referring to
the Austrian Patent Office's "Merkblattfir Gebrauchsmusteranmdd'"
(Pamphlet for Applicants of
Utility Models), which provides example claims).
211. The White Paper's commentary simply states that computer programs are omitted because "such inventions are currently protected either by patent (inventions relating to software) or
by copyright (computer programs as such)." COM(97)691, stpra note 20, at Part Five (explanatory commentary on Article 4). However, sidestepping the problems that have arisen under European patent law concerning the protection of computer software might not prove so simple. The
proposed exclusion for inventions "involving" computer programs may be subject to widely
varying interpretations that may ultimately resemble the variable interpretations given to the
computer program exclusion in the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973,
Art. 52, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. See, e g., Robert J. Hart, Patentability of Software at the European Patent Office, 2 INTL INTEI. PROF. LAW & POLCY CH. 49 (1996) (Hugh C. Hansen, ed.) (providing
an overview of cases interpreting Article 52 as applied to software-related inventions); Peter
Weissman, Computer Software as Patentable Subject Matter: Contrasting United States, Japanese, and
European Laws, 23 AIPLA QJ. 525 (1995) (providing a short discussion of Article 52).
It appears that efforts to adapt regular patent regimes to computer software-related inventions
are proceeding through direct reform of regular patent laws. For example, there is evidence that
the EC may soon prepare a consultative document on computer software patent eligibility. Paul
Waterschoot, An Overview of Recent Developments in Intellectual Property in the European Union, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL FORDHAM CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY, PROGRAM I 8 (1998). Similarly, in the United States, the regular

patent law has currently stabilized around an extraordinarily broad notion of eligibility, as embodied in administrative guidelines and recent case law. It remains to be seen whether this equilibrium will prove durable. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc., 149 E3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim directed to a transformation of data in accordance
with a mathematical algorithm recites patent eligible subject matter so long as it constitutes a
"practical application" of the algorithm, meaning that it "produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result').
212. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 4(b) (excluding "inventions relating to biological
material"). Cf. European Patent Convention, Art. 53(b) (excepting from patent eligibility "plant
or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals," but
saving from the exception "microbiological processes or the products thereof") (text in PATERSON,
supra note 95, at 524). One commentator has argued forcefully that a second tier patent regime
that extended protection to biotechnology products would be plagued with the same problems
that have surrounded the protection of biotechnology in Europe via the regular patent system. Ste
LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 91. Whether these problems will subside with the recent approval
of the Biotechnology Directive is currently a matter of speculation. See Biotechnology: MEPs Give
Formal Approval for Patenting Inventions, EURo. RIT. (May 16, 1998) (reporting the European
Parliament's approval, at second reading, of the Proposal for a Directive on the Legal Protection
of Biotechnology Inventions). Cf Kern, supra note 85, at 633 (relating that drafters of the Max
Planck proposal considered novel approaches to subject matter eligibility that departed from the
language of EPC Article 52, but ultimately concluded that the second tier regime should await
direct reform of the EPC. Further ruling out the possibility that second tier regimes could serve
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contrast, sets up no exclusions for nontraditional subject matter, rely213
ing merely on existing eligibility standards from regular patent law.
To the extent that the existing standards are problematic, those problems are transferred directly into the second tier system. Under neither
the European nor the Australian approach can the creation of the second tier system be justified as a creative new approach to the protection of non-traditional subject matter.
The European second tier proposal demonstrates yet further timidity in excluding from eligibility "inventions relating to chemical or
pharmaceutical substances or processes," 214 which also might be designated loosely as non-traditional subject matters in light of the history
of utility model systems. 215 Moreover, the White Paper's rationale for
this exclusion seems wholly contrived, when viewed from a conceptual
perspective. 216 The apparent influence of special interest politics is
hardly masked here. The effect of such influences should give rise to
serious concern in Europe that second tier protection will become a
vessel for special protections, or serve as a precedent for additional new
as a stimulus for reform).
213. Government Response, supra note 112, at Recommendation 9 ("The same subject matter
protecrable under a standard parent should be protectable under the innovation patent."). See also
id. at text accompanying Recommendation 9 (commenting that "limiting the type or extent of
technology coverage might preclude the innovation patent system from covering new and
emerging technologies").
214. COM(97)691, supranote 20, at Art. 4(c).
215. Numerous existing utility model systems exclude chemical and pharmaceutical inventions from eligibility. See, eg., LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 88-89, n.200 (listing numerous
national systems and noting subject matter exclusions relating to chemical and pharmaceutical
inventions).
216. The commentary asserts that chemical and pharmaceutical inventions "call for lengthy
preparation before being placed on the market and should therefore be given patent protection,
which lasts longer than utility model protection." COM(97)691, sapra note 20, at Part Five
(explanatory commentary on Art. 4). But this argument only explains why regular patent protection should be available for such inventions, not why second tier patent protection should be
withheld. More telling is the White Paper's subsequent comment that chemical and pharmaceutical inventions are "complex" and that "property rights involving no examination for novelty or
inventive step are out of place" for such inventions. Id.; see also Kingston, Patent Protection, supra
note 159, at 355 (asserting that the electrical and mechanical industries are characterized by
incremental advancement, unlike the chemical industries). But nor all chemical and pharmaceutical inventions are complex nor are they the results of dramatic breakthroughs. Moreover, not all

mechanical and electrical inventions are simple. If complexity is the real criterion, then some
classes of electronic and mechanical devices certainly would fall outside the scope of eligibility for
second tier protection, a concept that none of the existing proposals contemplate.
The Green Paper advocated the inclusion of chemical inventions within the scope of eligibility

for utility model protection. See COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 66. While acknowledging that
utility model protection might not be attractive for some types of chemical inventions (i.e., presumably those for which a long preparation period is required and for which the inventors there-

fore aggressively seek out longer term protection), this does not justify excluding protection for
such inventions. See id. (arguing that "[a] measure which allows protection of substances may
serve no purpose in some cases; but that does not mean that protection should be refused in other
cases where it would be necessary and reasonable.").
However, the Green Paper vacillated on the eligibility of process inventions. See id. at 66-67
(ultimately declining to take a position on the issue).
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regimes of rights according to political whims. 217 It is also possible to
read into the "sculpted" eligibility provision of the White Paper proposal a sense of ambivalence as to the efficacy of second tier rights in
general, which should also serve as a warning sign.
4. Access for Indigenous Enterprises in Developing Economies
Experience with classical utility model regimes reveals that local in218
ventors comprise the vast majority of utility model applicants.
Based in large part on these statistics, a number of scholars have observed that utility model regimes might be of interest to developing
2 19
countries seeking to spur local growth in technological enterprises.
A characteristic scholarly assertion is that "utility model protection
assumes particular importance for the domestic economy at the beginning of a country's industrialization, '220 and there is already evidence

217. Professor Reichman's scholarship argues forcefully against the proliferation of new "hybrid" intellectual property regimes. See Parr III.C infra for a further discussion of this scholarship
and its theoretical ramifications.
An important recent example from the United States is the "Vessel Hull Design Protection
Act," which is to appear as a new Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.). The Act offers
protection to "original" designs of"useful articles," and proceeds to define "useful articles" for the
purpose of the chapter as being limited to "a vessel hull, including a plug or mold, which in
normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information." For the statutory text, see Conference Report on DigitalMillennium
Copyright Act (H.R. 2281), H. Rept. 105-796 (1998), reprinted in 56 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYalso Copyright
RIGHT J.(BNA), 705 (Oct. 15, 1998) (defining "useful article" in § 1301(b)(2)). See
Reform Legislation Is Clearedfor White Houe, 56 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), 694
(Ocr. 15, 1998) (reporting Senate and House approval of the conference report).
218. See Richards, supra note 6, at 47-3 (referring to 1992 WIPO statistics); COM(95)370,
supra note 20, at 36-38 (collecting statistics). This fact may have important implications for any
future debate over second tier parent protection in the United States. The European proposal is
being portrayed as extending some benefit, particularly to local SMEs. It seems only logical that
small enterprises in the United States would adopt this idea in order to argue that the United
States government should extend similar benefits to U.S. small enterprises.
219. See, eg., J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 50, at 811 n.72 (1992)
(observing that in addition to being of interest to SMEs, utility models seem to be of great interest to developing countries); Hanns Ullrich, GATT Industrial PropertyProtection, Fair Trade and
Development, in GATT OR WIPO? NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTEL-

LECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 153 (1989) (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker, eds., 1989)
("[Utility models) are important for the development of indigenous technology by developing
countries in terms of the lower prerequisites to the grant of protection, the lower cost and their
shorter terms.") (citing, inter alia, Chen Ruifang, The Utility Model System and its Benefits for
China-Some DeliberationsBased on German andJapaneseLegislation, 14 INT'L REV.INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L.493 (1983)).
For a report of an apparently contrary view, see Dick van Engelen, The MisappropriationDoctrine
in the Netherlands, 22 INT'L REv.INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 11, 21 (1991) (reporting the

concern in Europe that an expanded utility model regime would inure largely to the benefit of
foreign interests).
220. Hausser, supra note 44, at 319. Generally, these assertions are based upon historical experience with the German and Japanese systems. See also Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 61, at
2455 (observing that utility model regimes were adopted in Germany, Italy, and Japan at early
stages in those countries' industrial development and proved to be of interest in rewarding local
innovation); id. at note 101 (collecting additional sources). Some scholars have also seized upon
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that this advice is being taken seriously in some quarters. 221 One
commentator has gone so far as to argue that the success of Japanese
firms in developing "incremental changes in technology" might be
attributable to Japan's utility model regime. 222 In some ways, all of
these arguments are merely variations on the basic argument that second tier protection will benefit ill-funded SMEs. 223
One should not be too quick to accept the premise that utility models have an established record of benefiting nascent indigenous technological enterprises. First, there is little, if any, causal evidence that
would demonstrate that the existence of a utility model regime in Japan should be given even a share of the credit for Japan's rise to economic prominence.
Second, statistics showing predominantly local use of utility model
regimes may prove only that multinational firms largely ignore classical utility model protection, 224 rather than demonstrating any unique
benefit to small enterprise. Indeed, there could be multiple reasons for
multinational companies to ignore utility model protection of the clasthe negative implication that utility model systems would not be of interest in developed economies. See Hausser, id. (observing a decline in filings for utility models in Germany and Japan).
221. Latin American nations, for example, have recently embraced utility model protection.
See, ag., Carlos M. Correa, Harmonizationrof lntleetualProperty Rights in Latin America: Is there Still
Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. Irrr'L L. & POL. 109, 131 (1996-97) (suggesting that
utility models "may be an important tool to encourage innovation in Latin American countries,
many of which (Brazil, Costa Rica, Uruguay and, more recently, the Andean Group and Argentina) have already introduced this type of legislation"). For the relevant legislative texts, see Andean Group Decisions on Industrial Property (Decision 344) (1993), 34 LLM. 1635, 1641
(1995); Argentine Patent Law No. 24.481 (1995)). However, it must be noted that these regimes
follow along the lines of the classic utility model regime in that they tend to impose a spatial
form limitation on eligible subject matter. See Suthersanen, sApra note 10, at 48-9 (noting that
harmonized provisions applicable to the Andean group nations, as well as national provisions in
various other South American countries, include a spatial form requirement).
222. See, e.g., Derzko, supra note 147, at 17 (arguing that Japan's utility model regime may be

responsible forJapan's heavy involvement in developing "incremental changes in technology").
223. See, eg., Kern, supra note 85, at 630 (arguing that second tier protection will benefit less
developed European nations, such as East European states, because (1) inventors in such states
may lack funds to pursue full scale patent protection; and (2) such states include many $MEs). See
also Kingston, Patent Protection, supra note 159, at 360. Kingston expands to a global scale the
argument that large entities dominate the market in incremental innovation because they can
effectively "protect" their incremental developments through market power, and that this state of
affairs requires a remedy because large entities innovate at a lower level than would be socially
desirable. The global version of the argument holds that economically powerful countries likewise
dominate the market for incremental innovation over economically less powerful countries, implying that a remedy in the form of incremental innovation protection among economically less
powerful countries is also socially desirable. This, however, seems to assume a high level of innovation among less economically powerful countries, a point at which analogy to SMEs surely
breaks down.
224. Some scholars have made similar claims. Ullrich, supra note 219, at 153 (asserting that
second tier protection warranted no mention in the GATT discussions because such regimes
"have no importance for internationally operating enterprises of industrialized countries"). The
Green Paper presents statistics suggesting that large firms perceive utility model protection as
being less important than other forms of protection, but unfortunately seems to leap to the conclusion that the protection actually benefits SMEs. COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 14-15.
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sical variety. They may perceive the protection to be illusory, given the
possibility that the scope of protection will extend only to the external
appearance of the protected device by extension of the spatial form
requirement. Relatedly, predominantly local use of utility model regimes might stem from the fact that utility model protection relies so
heavily on adjudication through the court system, and multinationals
may believe that many developing countries lack the infrastructure
that would be required for reliable adjudication of utility model
claims. Negative connotations associated with certain labels such as
"petty patent" may also play a role. 225 Finally, the statistical evidence
available in the current literature only makes the case for utility model
regimes designed along classical lines, not for new second tier proposals.
Another argument for the introduction of second tier patent regimes
in developing countries, and one that may best explain why such countries are adopting regimes currently, is tied to the perception that developing countries gain little or nothing by compliance with the patent provisions of the TRIPs agreement. According to this argument, a
developing country might be well served by creating both a regular
patent system and a second tier patent system, establishing such strict
patentability standards for regular patent protection that most inventions would be relegated to the relatively limited protection offered
under the second tier system. In such a case, a second tier patent protection regime is not being created for its own merits, but rather as a
hedge against regular patent protection.
Whether this amounts to a sensible justification for creating a second tier regime depends on the accuracy of the underlying assumption
that regular patent protection disadvantages developing countries. A
full evaluation of this assumption would go well beyond the scope of
this paper. Scholars are divided on this fundamental issue. 226 It does
seem that, given the inherent flaws of second tier regimes, it would
require a particularly strong showing of adverse consequences flowing
from the regular patent system to justify erecting a second tier system
as a hedge.

225. Nakajima, supra note 98, at 16 (suggesting that the small percentage of foreign applications for Japanese utility models might be explained by a general lack of credibility of the system,

or perhaps because the name itself connotes a lesser right).
226. See, eg., A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "PoliteForM of Economic ImpecrialJ. TANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (arguing that the patent provisions in TRIPs stand
ism," 29 VAMN.
to benefit primarily large economies at the expense of developing nations); J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement: Introduaction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND.J. TRANS WAT'L L. 363,

371-72 (1996) (same); cf Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA
PAc. BAsIN L. J. 166 (1994) (arguing that the introduction of Western-style patent regimes
would benefit developing economies).
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B. Second Tier Harmonizationas a Prototypefor RegularPatent
Harmonization
The harmonization agenda is relevant to the proposals for expanded
second tier patent protection in a number of ways, some obvious and
some more subtle. Most straightforwardly, the drive to harmonize second tier patent protection in Europe stands comfortably as one component of a multi-pronged effort to harmonize European intellectual
property standards. 227 The White Paper indulges this rationale liberally, speaking in typically laudatory terms of the benefits of panEuropean harmonization. 228 The elaboration of a pan-European second
tier patent regime could, in theory, serve as a prototype for Europe229
wide, and ultimately worldwide, substantive patent harmonization.
Whatever may be the prospects in theory for the use of second tier
proposals as harmonization prototypes, it appears that second tier proposals will be capable of advancing only marginally the agenda for substantive patent law harmonization. The current European proposal has
abandoned the idea of creating a Community-level right, pursuing
instead the option of harmonized national standards. 230 Beyond the
227. See, eg., Thomas C. Vinje, Harmonising Intellectual Property Laws in the European Union:
Past, Present, and Future, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 361, 371 (1995) (placing the second tier
proposal into the context of European intellectual property harmonization generally); Beier, supra
note 84 (same).
228. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at 6 ("Harmonisation will make it possible for equivalent
national systems of utility model protection to coexist ....) But c. COM(95)370, supranote 20,
at vii-viii (asserting that "harmonization of national systems would go some way towards improving the situation, but would not solve all the problems which arise," and proposing as alternatives a mutual recognition ofrights system, or a Community-level right).
The White Paper asserts that harmonization is necessary because the differences in existing national standards for second tier patent protection obstruct the free movement of goods and distort
competition. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at 6-8 (concerning free movement of goods); id. at
8-9 (concerning distortions to competition); COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 33-35 (arguing that
differences in national utility model systems can result in obstacles to the free movement of goods
within the European Union); id. at 35-36 (arguing that the differences in national utility model
systems can result in the distortion of competition in the European Union by, for example, allowing imitators in states having weak protection to establish a larger market share than originators and establishing a base for export of the imitation goods to states having stronger protection). See also Krasser, supra note 17, at 951 (observing that initial discussions on European regular patent harmonization in the early 1960s failed to consider the possibility that disparities in
utility model protection could obstruct free trade across Europe, which may partially explain why
utility models were not made a part of harmonization efforts).
Commentators seem unanimous in the opinion that existing standards in national second tier
patent regimes are, in fact, materially different. See, e.g., Suthersanen, supra note 10, at 45 (surveying second tier regimes and finding limited consensus among national regimes in Europe).
229. For background on efforts to achieve worldwide substantive harmonization of regular
patent systems, see generally HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HAMONiZATION (1993); Symposium, The Harmonizationof InternationalPatent Law, 26 J. MARsHLL L. REv. 437 (1993).
230. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at 9-10 (reporting that the creation of a Communitylevel right, or, alternatively, a "mutual recognition" system in which a single national second tier
patent would automatically be recognized regionally, would not be pursued in the current legislative effort because these proposals "aroused only limited interest on the part of the sectors of
business and industry concerned in the course of the consultation exercise set in train by the
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question of whether meaningful harmonization of standards can be
achieved through such an approach, 231 the abandonment of any effort
to create a Community utility model guarantees that European policymakers will have no occasion to grapple with the difficult issues that
have stalled substantive patent law harmonization in Europe, such as
233
the issues of translations 232 and pan-European judicial arrangements.
The second tier harmonization proposal does not even contemplate a
grace period provision,234 which would have been instructive in demCommission with the Green Paper"). Ravillard, supra note 165, at 5-6 (reporting that a "large
majority" favored a directive that would harmonize national laws).
The Green Paper, by contrast, advocated the creation of a Community-level right.
COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 54 (proposing that legislation creating a Community-level utility
model scheme contemplate a two-tiered regime "consisting of an array of national utility model
rights and a Community utility model right"). Similarly, the Max Planck draft proposed an "a la
carte" system, meaning that the protection would be granted in a Community instrument, but
applicants would be entitled to designate selected member states in which the protection would
be effective. See Kern, supra note 85, at 631 (explaining distinctions between this model and the
EPC approach to regular patents). The Max Planck proposal envisioned a Community Utility
Model Office connected to the EPO. See id at 631-32.
231. The extent to which a system ofseparate national regimes, even ones having harmonized
standards, can ever really become "transparent" to users may be questioned. In the context of the
second tier patent proposals specifically, the Economic and Social Committee has recently pointed
out that the goal of providing truly equivalent national systems cannot realistically be achieved
without mutual recognition of national protection by the various Member States. July 1998
Opinion, supra note 20, at O.J. (C235) 27, Point 3.3 (insisting that the goal of providing
equivalent protection across Member States
"cannot be met unless a system of mutual recognition
of national protection by the Member States is consolidated at the same time .... [I]t
is essential
that the plan to harmonize national legislation should, 'following effective harmonization, provide for a later stage of mutual recognition of national rights."') (citing June 1996 Opinion, stipra
note 20, at O.J. (C174) 11, Point 6.11).
For an infamous example of the European patent system's resistance to transparency, one need
look no further than the dramatic inconsistencies in national enforcement proceedings involving
the Epilady hair remover patent. See, e.g., Sanford T. Colb, The Epilady Hair Remover Litigation, in
Global Intellectual Property Series 1993: Successful Multi-Country Patent Litigation Strategies, 366
PLI/PAT 107 (1993).
232. Likewise, the Max Planck proposal appears not to have come to grips with the translation
controversy. Kern, supra note 85, at 640-41.
233. The recent Green Paper on the Community Patent identifies the translation problem and
problems with judicial arrangements as two key problems with the existing regular patent system
in Europe. See Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe-Promoting Innovation through Patents, COM(97)314 final at 8 (translations problem); id. at 10
(judicial arrangements).
On the other hand, the Green Paper does mention the possibility of utility model harmonization as one of several contemplated measures to make the patent system more attractive to small
enterprises. Id. at 20.
European second tier proposals also will nor address some major issues standing in the way of
worldwide substantive patent harmonization, most notably the first-to-invent vs. first-to-file
controversy.
234. COM(97)691, supra note 20, at 34 (defining the state of the art to include "everything
made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other
way, beforethe date offiling of the utility model application") (emphasis added).
In contrast, the Max Planck proposal would have offered a 12-month grace period. See Kern,
supra note 85, at 634 (discussing Article 6 of the proposal); Max Planck Proposal, supra note 85,
at 712 (providing the text of proposed Article 6). The proposed grace period would have been
even more generous than current U.S. standards in regards to its treatment of third-party activity.

1999 / Second Tier Patent Protection
onstrating how a grace period could fit into European regular patent
law.
The European effort to harmonize second tier patent protection appears destined to do little more than create an institutional history
which could later be drawn upon to facilitate harmonization of regular
patent standards both at the European level and worldwide. Indeed, it
seems equally probable that the effort might actually divert resources
away from the enterprise of harmonizing regular patent law. This is a
serious problem considering that the harmonization of substantive
patent law seems to require vast reserves of political willpower and
intellectual capital. Hence, rather than stimulating regular patent
harmonization and reform, second tier protection could well distract
235
significantly from it.
III. THE UNCERTAIN THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
SECOND TIER PATENT REGIMES
I have argued that history provides a far more limited record on the
efficacy of second tier protection than some have supposed, and that
policy considerations such as the access and harmonization rationales
likewise offer but flimsy support for the extension of second tier patent
regimes. In fact, I have suggested that when underlying policies are
properly considered, second tier patent regimes might well do more
harm than good by actually retarding the progress of technological
advancement. 236 Having evaluated second tier protection from the
Id, (providing that information disclosed by a third party, but based upon information received
from the applicant, would not be included in the state of the art). Cf Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1451-54 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (third-party disclosures consti-

tute prior art even when they are based on information misappropriated from applicant) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1995)).

Debate over the grace period provision in the Max Planck proposal centered around whether
the proposal should act as a "harbinger" for the amendment of European regular patent law to
include a grace period. Kern, supra note 85, at 634. A similar issue arose in connection with the

WIPO Patent Law Treaty. See Article 12, Dislcosures Not Affecting Novelty and Inventive Step
(Grace Period), Basic Proposal, PLT/DC/3, pp. 22-23, corresponding to the Draft Treaty,
HICE/VI/3 (English) (Feb. 15, 1990), 75, 77; see generally WEGNER, supra note 229, at 88-97

(discussing Article 12).
235. See, e.g., Edward Armitage, EU IndustrialPropertyPolicy: Priorityfor Patents?, 18 EUR. IN-

TELL. PROP. R v. 555 (1996). Armitage argues that "[a]U industrial property efforts" at the EU
level should be concentrated on developing the Community patent regime; by focusing on the

second tier patent proposal, EC policymakers have "got their priorities wrong." Id at 558. To
Armitage, the utility models initiative "has neither the intrinsic merits nor the urgency to justify
its standing in the way ofaction on the Community patent. The utility model system stands only

on the fringes of the patent system. The [utility models initiative] aims at perfect order on this
fringe while the centre is in some disarray." Id. See also Christopher Tootal, The European Patent

System: Timefora Review?, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415 (1995) (portraying the utility models
proposal as a distraction from higher priority reform needs respecting the regular patent system,
such as the reform ofopposition proceedings).

236. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (referring to the increased "clearance" costs
imposed on competitors in a marketplace dominated by second tier patents).
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standpoints of history and policy, I next consider the place of such pro-

tection in intellectual property theory, focusing especially on the implications of second tier protection in light of economic theories of the
237
patent system.
At least three topics warrant consideration. First, second tier patent

protection regimes squarely raise the classic conundrum of allocating
rights between basic inventors and improvers. A theory of anticommons property can be applied to reveal a potentially troublesome theoretical flaw in the approach that second tier protection takes toward
this allocation of rights. Second, such regimes center on a soft obviousness/inventive step standard. Because the inventive step standard is

generally considered central to the economically efficient operation of a
patent system, second tier regimes may fundamentally challenge economic theories of the patent system. Third, second tier protection can

be viewed, at least from a U.S. perspective, as a decision to replace an
existing trade secrets regime for subpatentable innovation with a prop-

erty rights regime, a matter of fruitful theoretical inquiry. The following three sections take up each of these questions to elaborate on
the theoretical ramifications of introducing second tier patent protection.
A. Second Tier Protectionand Follow-On Improvers:
A Theory of Anticommons Property
In a provocative recent article, a scholar of property theory concludes
that "[glovernments must take care to avoid creating anticommons
property accidentally when they define new property rights. ' 238 Considered analysis suggests that second tier patent regimes pose a substantial threat of generating anticommons property, creating the potential for unfortunate economic consequences that would be played
out in the form of a "tragedy of the anticommons."
In the Western tradition, property is routinely conceptualized as an
aggregation of rights in a tangible or intangible object. Three classes
of property can be distinguished by reference to the aggregation of
rights: private, commons, and anticommons. Private property, for example, can be understood to exist where an identifiable owner holds all
or most of a specified core bundle of rights. 239 Commons and anti237. Only a few scholars have taken up the task. See, e.g., FRANcOIS PHRRsT, L'AuroNoAnfs
DUREGCE DEPROTECTION DES DESSINS ETMODLES 188-95, 231-33 (1974); Marie-Angle
Prot-Morel, L'Ambiguitf du concept de mod~le d'utilitl, in ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE R.

FRANCESCHEI.sI 425 (1983), cited in Reichman, Free Riders, supra note 13, at 71, n.237. Professor
Reichman's work is also highly relevant. See infra Part III.C.
238. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propertyin Ie Transitionfrom Marx and
Markets, 111 HARv.L. REv. 622, 688 (1998).
239. Id. at 663. As an example of a well-accepted conceptualization of the core bundle of

rights that characterizes private property, Heller turns to Honor s "standard incidents" ofprivate
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commons property, by contrast, exist where no individual, identifiable
owner holds all or most of a core bundle. In particular, a commons is
said to exist where no individual holds a right to exclude others from
an object or resource, such that multiple individuals enjoy the privilege of using the resource. 240 An anticommons, as Heller defines it,
exists where multiple individuals own rights to exclude others from an
object or resource, such that no one has an effective privilege of using
241
the resource.
Professors Heller and Eisenberg have argued that patent rules and
practices in the field of biomedical research may generate anticommons
property.24 2 Heller and Eisenberg point, for example, to current efforts
to secure patent protection for "upstream" biomedical research, such as
gene fragments. If various owners hold a multiplicity of patents covering numerous gene fragments, each of the owners would enjoy the
right to exclude others as to an individual gene fragment. A possible
result may be that no one has a commercially significant privilege of
use, especially where the commercially significant use entails the use of
multiple gene fragments for the "downstream" development of com243
mercial products.
This is a particularly important insight because patent law is, in
fact, inherently prone to the generation of "concurrent fragment" anticommons property. The prototypical manifestation is the so-called

property, including such familiar candidates as "the right to exclusive possession," "the power of
transmissibility by gift, devise, or descent," and so forth. lI at 663, n.187, citing A.M. Honor6,
Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
The qualification in the characterization of private property-that it may be characterized by
ownership of most of the standard incidents--is especially important in considering how the
patent right firs with Honor6's taxonomy. Honor6 includes, for example, the "right to personal
use and enjoyment" as a component of the core bundle of rights of private property. The patent
right does not confer a positive right of use on the patent owner, but only a right to exclude. See,
e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548 (1852) ("The franchise, which the patent grants,
consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing
patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent.").
Similarly, Honor6 includes the "lack of any term on these rights," whereas the patent right is
4
subject to a limited term. See, eg., 35 U.S.C. §15 (aX2) (1995) (the term of a United States patent extends twenty years from the date of application, subject to extension in limited circumstances).
deciHeller also identifies two other critical, distinguishing features of private property: full
sion-making authority vested in an identifiable owner, Heller, supra note 238, at 662 ("[p]rivate
property requires that one owner have full decisionmaking authority over an object, subject to
some common law and regulatory limits"), and restrictions against decomposing the core bundle
of rights in ways that impair the alienability of the object to which the property rights attach. Id.
at 664.
240. Heller, supra note 238, at 623-24.
241. Id. at 624.
242. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 ScmNcE 698 (May 1, 1998).
243. See id. at 699 (referring to this phenomenon as a "concurrent fragment" anticommons and
asserting that "defining property rights around isolated gene fragments seems at the outset unlikely to track socially useful bundles ofproperty rights in future commercial products").
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"blocking" patent, commonly arising when one patent holder owns
rights to a pioneering invention, and another owner owns rights to a
commercially necessary improvement. The improver may be precluded
from practicing the improvement because doing so may well infringe
claims in the pioneer patent. Likewise, the pioneer may be precluded
by the improver's patent from marketing the pioneering invention
44
fitted with the commercially needed improvement.
Under circumstances such as these, the conditions for the creation of
anticommons property are met. Both the pioneer and the improver
own rights to exclude, but the rights are overlapping, such that neither can alone aggregate the bundle of rights that would be necessary
to proceed with the marketing of a commercial product. Effectively,
neither of the owners has a commercially meaningful privilege of use;
the bundle of commercially meaningful rights has been fragmented.
The question then becomes whether the parties can bargain to achieve
245
a cross-licensing arrangement.
Second tier patent protection magnifies substantially the potential
for the creation of concurrent fragment anticommons property. 246 Under second tier regimes, obvious improvements on basic technology,
which would have remained in the public domain under the rules governing regular patent regimes, 247 will now potentially be subject to
second tier patent protection. Multiple owners may now enjoy property rights in a multiplicity of obvious improvements, as the rights to
the technology are carved up into tinier and tinier fragments.248 The
relative ease with which second tier patent protection can be obtained
only compounds this problem because it opens the door to greater
numbers of improvers who may fragment rights more quickly. In one
sense, this is the mirror image of the scenario that Heller and Eisen-

244. See, ag., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in IntellectualProperty Law, 75 Tax.
L. R v.989, 1009-10 (1997) (discussing the phenomenon of blocking patents); Robert Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 T13NN. L.
REV. 75 (1994) (providing a detailed treatment).
245. See infra notes 253-259 and accompanying text.
246. I am speaking here of current second tier patent proposals, not necessarily of classic utility model laws in which the spatial form requirement may have kept the system in check. Although I am not convinced that even classic utility model regimes appropriately allocated rights
between initial inventors and improvers, others have offered a more generous assessment. Scs
Reichman, Legal Hybrids supra note 61, at 2459 (arguing that "(utility models] represent a form
of industrial property protection that did nor unduly discourage competitors from building on an
innovator's contributions and that usually permitted an improver to capture the economic value
of his improvement.").
247. That is, assuming that the improvement could nor, as a practical matter, be protected by
trade secret protection.
248. Chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturers in Europe apparently have foreseen this. Set
Kem, supra note 85, at 630 (speculating, apparently correctly, that large chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturers would be expected to lobby against model protection, particularly because
they would fear multiple applications, characteristically from SMIEs, on new uses for protected
compounds).
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berg describe for biotechnology patenting. 249 While they are concerned about the possibility that multiple owners of patent rights in
upstream research results will thwart a downstream improver, I am
concerned about multiple downstream improvers thwarting each
25 0
other.
If a second tier patent regime would, in theory, tend to generate anticommons property, the next question is whether this is really problematic from the standpoint of social utility. It is well-established that
commons property in a resource may lead to overuse of that resource,
referred to as the "tragedy of the commons." 251 Whether the creation
of anticommons property in a resource leads to underuse of that resource, i.e., whether there exists a "tragedy of the anticommons," has
only recently been elucidated. 25 2 However, the problem can be analyzed in familiar Coasian terms: if the legal regime has awarded rights
inefficiently, market participants will bargain among themselves to
reallocate those rights efficiently, and the consequences of the economically inefficient legal regime, in terms of social costs, will be erased.
Whether Coasian-style bargaining really occurs in the wake of the
deployment of second tier patent rights is ultimately an empirical
question worthy of close attention.25 3 However, even in the absence of
249. Additionally, though unlikely, second tier protection could also give rise to anticommons

property in the same fashion that Heller and Eisenberg describe for biomedical research. Researchers might attempt to secure second tier patent rights in relatively raw technological infor-

mation, just as biomedical researchers are attempting to secure regular patent protection for basic
research tools. In the case of the second tier rights, the potential for researchers to secure second
tier protection on basic information would seem to be limited substantially by disclosure and

utility requirements, which are carried over from regular patent law. On the other hand, if disclosure and utility requirements are eroded, this protection against the potential generation of anticommons property may well disappear.
250. Professor Heller offers a separate example of the emergence of an anticommons which
seems very closely analogous to the anticommons that might appear as a result of a second tier

patent regime. Japanese real property law apparently has allowed the extreme fragmentation of
rights in real property, such that owners, renters, and so forth may well have multiple, overlapping rights in extremely small land parcels. Heller, supra note 238, at 684. The difficulty in
aggregating commercially meaningful packages of rights has apparently hampered major construction efforts, such as the reconstruction of Kobe, Japan, following the 1994 earthquake. Id. at
684-85.
251. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (credited with
introducing the "tragedy of the commons" label to characterize the concept). As Heller summa-

rizes the concept:
A tragedy of the commons can occur when too many individuals have privileges of use in a

scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively
overconsume scarce resources. Each individual finds that she benefits by consumption, even
though she imposes larger costs on the community.

Heller, supranote 238, at 677.
252. This is Professor Heller's principal task. As Heller puts it:
A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in
a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively
waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a social optimum.

Id. at 677.
253. Professor Merges has considered whether such bargaining occurs in the context of the
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empirical evidence, it seems safe to predict that many second tier patent holders will encounter steep transaction costs that may thwart efforts to bargain to an efficient re-aggregation of patent rights. There
are many potential sources of transaction costs that would hinder the
market amelioration of a second tier patent anticommons. First, given
the complexities of claim construction, it will undoubtedly require
expertise even to identify the various second tier patent rights that
must be assembled in order to clear the way for the marketing of a
given commercial product. Second, given the nature of the second tier
grant, it seems probable that, in any given area of technical endeavor,
there may well be a plethora of stakeholders with whom to deal. 254
Indeed, large enterprises might be expected to saturate selected areas
by the prodigious acquisition of essentially defensive second tier patent
rights. 255 Third, the inherently insecure nature of the second tier patent right can be expected to lead to excessive transaction costs in many
cases. Even in the regular patent system, it is well appreciated that
uncertainty over both the value of the invention and the scope of
claims may represent an insurmountable obstacle to efficient bargaining.256 Without any substantive pre-grant examination, crucial matters

pioneer/improver situation, in reference to regular patent regimes. See Merges, supra note 244, at
82-84 (analyzing the obstacles to Coasian bargaining and presenting the judicially derived "reverse doctrine of equivalents" as an example of a judicial response to bargaining breakdown between a pioneer and improver).
254. In this regard, the anticommons that may be created by the prototypical single pioneer/single improver scenario may be less durable. The pioneer and the improver may be more
likely to be able to bargain with low transaction costs. But cf. id at 89-90 (suggesting that uncertainty and valuation problems may preclude successful bargaining between the pioneer and
improver).
The probable presence of numerous bargainers in the second tier anticommons may support
Professor Reichman's view that second tier patent subject matter (i.e., obvious improvements on
patented technology) should be subjected to a liability regime, rather than a property regime. Sce
infra notes 313-324 and accompanying text. For the classic argument that the presence of multiple parties is one of the factors pointing away from a property rule and towards a liability rule, sct
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Properly Rules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:One Vicw
of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. Ray. 1089, 1107-10 (1972).
255. This is another manifestation of the patent flooding problem. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for parties to flood the system with second tier patents). For a discussion of the perceived patent flooding problems encountered in the Japanese
patent system prior to recent amendments, see, e.g., Jeffrey Wolfson, Note, Patent Flooding in the
Japanese Patent Office: Methods for Reducing Patent Flooding and Obtaining Effcctiv Patent Protcction,
27 GEo. WASH. J. INTL L. & ECON. 531 (1993-94).
256. Se, eg., Lemley, supra note 244, at 1055. See also Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 242, at
700 (arguing that the long pendency time of regular patent applications in the biotechnology
patenting area is a source of uncertainty spawning transaction costs because, when applications
are pending, the scope of the ultimate claims remains unclear, complicating any contemporaneous
licensing negotiations). Second tier patent rights would enjoy a short pendency time, but this is
illusory since no definitive notion of the scope of the claims in a second tier patent can be developed until litigation.
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such as the scope 257 and validity258 of a second tier patent will remain
highly unsettled until litigation.25 9 This poses a seemingly intractable
dilemma for second tier patent rights which are premised on the notion of trading away certainty for quick, low-cost issuance. The cost of
uncertainty, especially at the enforcement stage, seems chronically underappreciated in second tier patent proposals and represents one of the
most serious flaws in those proposals.

257. For example, in a second tier regime there would be no examination for compliance with
the enablement requirement, which is emerging as a critical tool in adjudicating claim scope for
regular patents in emerging areas of technology. See, eag.,John W. Barton, Patent Scope in Biotechnology, 26 INT'L RFV. INDus. PROP. & COPRYr. L. 605 (1995); Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in the
Rapidly Developing Arts-Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. Tm. O'F. Soc'y 608 (1988). Additionally, the
prosecution history developed in the course of pendency of a second tier patent would be minimal, thus eliminating the use of the prosecution history to furnish information as to the meaning
of claim terms. See, ag., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 E3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (identifying the prosecution history as a source of intrinsic evidence on claim interpretation).
Some second tier proposals approach claim construction in a manner that seems to invoke the
linkage between the thresholds for protection and the scope of protection. See, e.g., Dinwoodie,
FederalizedFunctionalism, supra note 21, at 655 (recognizing the existence of a linkage)." These
second tier proposals have provided that courts should construe the claims in a second tier patent
"narrowly." Apparently, CIPA proposals would have included such a provision. Lees, Design Problems, supra note 54, at 226-28 (reporting that the proposed CIPA system would have avoided
EPC Article 69, and the protocol on its interpretation, by providing that claims would be
"strictly and literally" construed); LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 68; Kern, supra note 85, at 636
(reporting on a provision discussed in connection with the Max Planck proposal, and later
dropped, providing that where inventiveness was established other than by inventive step, a strict
and purely literal approach to claim construction would be employed, in contrast to purposive
construction). These sentiments do not appear to have found their way into the most current
proposals in Europe and Australia. See COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Art. 13 ("The claims shall
define the matter for which protection is sought."); Government Response, supra note 112, at
Recommendation 3 (providing that in the Australian innovation patent system, "[t]he existing
rules for determining the scope and interpretation of standard patent claims should apply for the
innovation patent").
A deliberate effort to give "narrow" construction, whatever that really might mean, creates the
potential for larger numbers of increasingly fragmented second tier rights. Moreover, if second
tier patent rights inhere predominantly in improvement inventions, then imposing an overarching narrowing doctrine runs exactly opposite the result that some modem economic theories of
patent protection would urge. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990) (questioning the broad scope of protection that
may be accorded to some pioneering inventions and urging greater incentives for follow-on improvers). It is not clear whether Merges' views on giving incentives to improvers would extend to
the point of actually supporting broad second tier patent rights, or whether Merges would consider this to be going too far in the direction of rivalrous races to invent.
258. The utterly opaque nature of the soft obviousness standard is likely to impose substantial
costs on litigants. See infra Part III.B.
259. The validity of regular United States patents, by contrast, is at least presumptively settled at the time the regular patent issues. See 35 U.S.C. 282 supra note 60 (explaining the presumption of validity). As for the scope of protection, early indication of the scope of claims has
been an ongoing concern even for regular patents. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116
S.Ct. 1384 (1996); John B. Pegram, Markman and its Implications, 78 J. PAT. TM. OFF. Soc'y 560
(1996) (commenting on pre-trial "Markman hearings" on claim interpretation and considering
whether they will provide an early indication of claim meaning). These problems are likely to be
even acute for second tier patents. See supra notes 171-187 and accompanying text (discussing the
costs ofenforcing second tier rights).
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Whether a second tier patent anticommons would persist, in general
or in specific areas of technical endeavor, would depend upon the extent of these transaction costs and on other factors such as the extent to
which second tier patent rights would need to be bundled together to
allow the marketing of particular commercial products. But while final
conclusions must await empirical evidence, the great potential for the
creation of a second tier patent anticommons should occasion serious
concern. There is some evidence that an anticommons, once created,
proves remarkably difficult to overcome. 260 Moreover, none of this
bodes very well for small enterprises and independent inventors, the
supposed beneficiaries of the second tier patent regime. Such parties
may well lack the resources and/or sophistication to participate in the
complex bargaining that would be necessary to re-aggregate patent
261
rights in an economically sensible fashion.
Alternative bargaining models exist and might prove more success262
ful.

As Professor Merges has explained in some detail, patent rights-

holders may collaborate by way of patent pooling arrangements. 263
Collective licensing arrangements have also developed in the copyright
arena for similar purposes. Second tier proposals, however, are characteristically oblivious to this downstream consequence of second tier
patent protection. At the very least, second tier patent proposals
should take cognizance of the probable need to facilitate the evolution
of pooling or collective rights arrangements in second tier patent
rights to attempt to avoid a persistent second tier anticommons. 264
B. Second Tier Protectionand the ProspectTheory:
The Economic Consequences of "Soft" Obviousness
The treatment of the inventiveness standard in modern second tier
proposals raises serious theoretical questions. Numerous second tier
regimes have long featured a standard of inventiveness that might be
260. Heller, supra note 238, at 685-87 (offering the example of the fractionation of Native
American lands as an illustration of the stubborn persistence of anticommons property once
established).

261. Similarly, Heller and Eisenberg raise concerns that holders of regular patent rights covering upstream biomedical research may be public institutions that are ill-equipped to cope with
high transaction costs. Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 242, at 700.

262. Indeed, Professor Merges argues that "the presence of high transaction costs does not halt
exchanges but encourages both producers and users to invest in institutions that lower the cost of
certain types of exchanges." Robert P. Merges, OfProperty Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REv.2655, 2662 (1994).
263. Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: Intellectual PropertyRights and Collective
Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996).
264. Indeed, if second tier regimes take hold and mature, it will be instructive to observe
whether pooling arrangements emerge. Second tier regimes might well provide an interesting
empirical platform against which Professor Merges' theories might be tested. It would be particularly interesting to note whether SMEs have any realistic opportunities to become participants in pools.
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referred to as "soft" obviousness. 265 Verbal formulations for the soft
obviousness standard, founded on hairsplitting distinctions, have always been suspect. 266 In theory, the negative consequences of soft obviousness for doctrinal stability in a classic utility model regime can be
mitigated. By employing the spatial form limitation, courts could use
the subject matter eligibility provision as the major discriminator between inventions deemed worthy of utility model protection and those
267
deemed unworthy.
Current proposals for second tier protection would upset the dynamic between the eligibility and obviousness provisions. Without the
spatial form requirement in the eligibility provision, the obviousness
provision will assume chief responsibility for maintaining an appropriate balance between the public domain material and protectable invention, just as it does in the regular patent system. 268 The prospect of
this new important role for soft obviousness raises two critical issues.
First, from a doctrinal perspective, consideration needs to be given to
whether soft obviousness is sufficiently durable to withstand the stress
of performing the main discriminating finction for second tier regimes. Second, from an economic standpoint, critical evaluation is
warranted as to whether the coupling of a liberal eligibility provision
with a soft obviousness standard appropriately implements the economic premises underlying patent protection. My principal task in
this section is to address the second point, although I also briefly consider the first.
In the interests of fostering doctrinal stability, current second tier
proposals might at least be expected to elaborate on the soft obviousness standard in a way that gives it greater substance. This need is particularly acute given that in most major patent systems the dividing
line between novelty and nonobviousness has never been perfectly
265. Seesupra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing German utility model law).
266. For example, under Japanese law, utility model law is directed to the protection of a "device," which is defined as the "creation of technical ideas by which a law of nature is utilized."
Utility Model Law, Art. 2 (1994) (cited in Nakajima, supra note 98, at 17). Regular patent law in
Japan, by contrast, protects an "invention," which is "the highly advanced creation of technical
ideas by which a law of nature is utilized." Patent Law, Art. 2 (1994) (emphasis added) (cited in

Nakajima, supra note 98, at 17). Correspondingly, the inventiveness standard for utility models
easily have been made from the prior art, while the
requires that the subject device could not very
inventiveness standard for regular patents requires that the claimed invention could not have
Utility Model Law, Art. 3(2) (1994); Patent Law, Art. 29
easily been made from the prior art. See
also Richards, supra note 6,
(1994) (emphasis added) (cited in Nakajima, supra note 98, at 17). See
at 47-9, note 16 (describing similarly futile standards in the utility model regimes of China,
Korea, Spain, and a handfil of other countries).
267. The presence of the spatial form limitation mitigated, but did not eliminate, the problems associated with the soft obviousness standard, because soft obviousness still applied to that
range of subject matter which satisfied the spatial form limitation.
268. Doctrines governing scope of protection play a similar role. Seesupra note 257 and accompanying text (referring to the importance of proposals for affording second tier patents a
narrow claim scope).
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sharp, 269 so that the task of establishing intermediate distinctions between novelty and soft obviousness, and between soft obviousness and
obviousness, is likely to be extraordinarily difficult. Yet, despite the
apparently widely held understanding that the inventiveness standard
will stand as a principle issue in future discussions on expanded second
tier protection, 270 second tier proponents have yet to articulate a workable soft obviousness standard. In Europe, the Green Paper ducked the
issue entirely,271 and the White Paper, while expressing a standard,
offers an entirely unfathomable explanation for it.27 2 The Committee's
review of the soft obviousness standard is particularly disappointing,
and only seems to reinforce the point that no one really has come to
grips with the standard. The Committee merely points out that the
standard should be directed towards identifying "major practical applications, chiefly in the fields of mechanical engineering, the electrical
industry, precision engineering, optics, and car manufacturing. ' 273 But
269. See, e.g., Crinson, supra note 19, at 44-45 (referring to the difficulty of distinguishing between novelty and nonobviousness in Canadian regular patent law).
270. See, e.g., Ravillard,supra note 165, at 7 (acknowledging that the inventiveness standard is
likely to be the subject of considerable discussion in the EC Council and the European Parliament).
271. The Green Paper merely concluded that
Community-level measures regarding utility models ought to allow a smaller inventive step
than is required for patents. The demarcation line between patent and utility model would
have to be formulated in a way which meets the needs of users, competitors and the lawcourts in equal measure.
COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 62.
Proposals generated by the CIPA and the Max Planck Institute do not offer any substantial additional insight into soft obviousness. CIPA reportedly considered three possible inventiveness
standards ("not clearly lacking in inventive step," "scintilla of invention," and "going beyond the
average craftsmanship in the field concerned"), in addition to the proposed Max Planck standard.
LLEWELYN, supranote 86, at 66 (reporting that CIPA expressed a preference for the first standard,
assuming that it would be interpreted in the same way as it had in British opposition practice
under the Patents Act of 1949); Lees, Design Problems, supra note 54, at 226-28 (discussing the
"not clearly lacking in inventive step standard"). See also supra notes 51-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the argument that British practice under the Patents Act of 1949 created a de
facto second tier system).
The Max Planck proposal borrowed the inventive step standard from EPC Article 56, sce Max
Planck Proposal, supra note 85, at 712 (Article 7), but engrafted an alternative, lower standard
under which a claimed invention would pass muster if it offered "an advantage of practical
significance." Id. at Art. 7(2). The accompanying explanation of the standard is not particularly
illuminating. See Kern, supranote 85, at 635-36.
272. The White Paper standard is founded on either "ease of use" or "practical advantage" as
evidence of the required level of inventiveness. See supra note 107 (quoting the standard). Unfortunately, the White Paper's commentary on the inventiveness provision is a classic example of the
bureaucratic idiom:
Examples [of subject matter that would meet the standard] are an invention making it possible to solve a technical problem and an invention relating to the effectiveness or ease of use
of a product in that it increases the product's usefulness by making it more effective and
easier to use.
COM(97)691, supra note 20, at Part Five (explanatory commentary on Article 6). It seems unlikely that practitioners and jurists grappling with the meaning of this unique inventive step
standard will find much illumination in such comments.
273. July 1998 Opinion, supranote 20, at C235/28-29, point 4.4.
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the Committee passes on the opportunity to actually articulate a more
meaningful overarching standard: "The Commission should work out a
way of formulating this requirement which could provide the best
guarantee of legal certainty both for the applicant and for the third
parties concerned." 27 4 The Australian proposal to use a modified "sub275
stantial novelty" test seems likely to fare no better.
The soft obviousness standard may also affect the interpretation of
the regular obviousness standard in regular patent law. If, as I suspect,
it turns out to be practically impossible to arrive at an actual soft obviousness standard, courts will presumably tend towards one of two extremes: either they will soften the soft obviousness standard to the
point at which it is utterly indistinguishable from novelty, or they will
go in the opposite direction, applying a standard that is essentially the
regular obviousness standard currently employed by courts. The latter
scenario involves a potentially troublesome ripple effect, for if courts
understand intuitively that they are to apply a more rigorous obviousness standard in regular patent law than in second tier patent law,
courts might ratchet up the regular obviousness standard to achieve
the required separation between regular and second tier patent standards, 276 Ironically, the introduction of second tier patent protection
may have the unintended effect of raising the obviousness standard for
regular patent protection and imposing additional acquisition costs on
applicants. This would presumably fall hardest on marginally financed
SMEs.
Whether the soft obviousness standard makes sense economically is
also a highly contentious matter. To begin with, modern proposals for
expanded second tier patent protection respond, at least in part, to the
so-called "prospect" theory of the patent system introduced by Professor Edmund Kitch in a widely debated 1977 article. 27 7 While classical
274. Id.
275. One commentator offers a stinging appraisal of the proposed inventiveness standard.
Glenn McGowan, Petty Patents to be replaced with "Innovation Patent System," 29 INTELLEcTUAL

PROPERTY FORUM, 35-36 (May 1997). McGowan finds the proposed standard "imponderable,"
Id. at 36 (arguing that to the extent that the "scintilla of invention" standard holds for regular
patents, the standard for innovation patents would have to be something less than a "scintilla"),
and suggests that the departure from conventional standards for inventiveness might render the
innovation patent scheme unconstitutional. Id. (arguing that the Australian Constitution, in

empowering the Federal Parliament to enact legislation regarding "patents of inventions," necessarily incorporates the inventiveness standard).
276. See LEiTm, supra note 159, at 120 (detailing this argument). This raises a broader concern
that the interaction between regular and second tier patent systems has nor carefully been consid-

ered and is not well understood. Professor Llewelyn seems to rap into similar concerns in questioning the appropriateness of second tier protection. LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 47-48 (arguing that in countries where a lower threshold of inventive step has already been set, it is possible

that creating a further underlying system of second tier protection will result in stifling of innovative activity because there will be almost no innovation that will be wholly unprotectable).
277. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & EcoN. 265

(1977).
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economic theories of the patent system emphasized offering incentives
to induce the creation of inventions, thereby focusing on the inventor's
activities prior to conceiving the invention, the prospect theory offers a
radically different perspective. 278 The prospect theory views the patent
grant as security for the future expenditure of development funds necessary to "innovate", i.e., to transform an invention into a commercial
product.27 9 Thus, the prospect theory focuses on the inventor's activities between conception of the invention and its ultimate commercialization. 280 Kitch's reference to a "prospect" in this context connotes "a
particular opportunity to develop a known technological possibility."281 The reference is intended to bring to mind the legal regime
governing mining prospects, 28 2 reflecting the property rights lineage
283
of the prospect theory.
The grant of patent protection to technological "prospects" is asserted to encourage innovative activity by giving the patentee the
ability to coordinate downstream innovation. For example, with the
security of patent protection for a technological prospect, the patentee
can proceed to "delegate aspects of the development to different firms
and coordinate the exchange of information among the firms," enhancing the efficiency of the innovation process by reducing duplication of efforts. 28 4 Similarly, having acquired intellectual property

278. Indeed, Professor Oddi identifies the prospect theory as marking the beginning of a postclassical period of economic theories of the patent system in which scholars have moved away
from traditional notions of reward and incentives to invent. A. Samuel Oddi, Un-unified Economic
Theoriesof Patents-TheNot-Quite-Holy Grail,71 NoTRu DAME L. RaV. 267, 281 (1996).
279. See, eg., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and ExperimentalUse, 56 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1017, 1037 (1989) (defining "innovation" as "putting existing
inventions to practice use"); Kitch, supra note 277, at 276-80 (outlining the advantages of a
patent system designed to facilitate innovation).
280. See Eisenberg, supra note 279, at 1037-38 (observing at the prospect theory differs from
incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories "with respect to the time frame in which the
incentive matters"; while incentive to invent and incentive to disclose theories "are concerned
with incentives that operate before a patent issues," the prospect theory "gives existing patents an
ongoing role in preserving the incentives of patent holders to invest in development during the
patent term.").
281. Kitch, supra note 277, at 266.
282. See, ag., Mark E Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.

Rav. 305, 313-16 (1992) (summarizing the connections between the prospect theory and the
legal regime governing mining claims).

283. See Lemley, supra note 244, at 1044-45 (emphasizing the property rights orientation of
Kitch's theory).
284. Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The FederalCircuit's PatentNonobviousness Standards: Thcoretfcal
Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1051, 1086-87 (1991). As Professor
Eisenberg puts it:
In the absence of a patent, different investigators might try independently to develop the
same invention in secrecy, each working without the benefit of the knowledge gained
through the efforts of the others. Exclusive rights in technological prospects thus promote
efficiency in research after the patent issues by putting the patent holder in a position to
monitor and control such research.
Eisenberg, sura note 279, at 1042.
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rights in a prospect, the patentee assertedly can more readily "marshal
complementary resources" or engage in other transactions concerning
the invention without expending resources on the preservation of
285
confidentiality.
The prospect theory calls for a soft obviousness standard, and therein
lies the quite powerful connection between the prospect theory and
current second tier patent proposals. Professor Kitch argued that "sub286
stantial novelty is an economically rational test of patentability," a
standard which seemed to call for elimination of the obviousness crite287
One
rion, or at least for a substantial reduction in its influence.
commentator has adeptly summarized the economic arguments underlying a substantial novelty standard for patentability under the
prospect theory:
[Tlhe prospect theory posits that patent rights over inventions increase innovative output. Therefore, no need exists for high patentability standards to offset the monopoly costs of patents. Accordingly, the standard of patentability should be much lower under the prospect theory than under the reward theory. In addition,
from a positive perspective, the prospect theory predicts that patentability rules will serve two primary functions: (1) providing security for the innovative process; and (2) reducing the amount of
wasteful competition for patent rights. The patent statutes will
patenting
accomplish both of these goals by allowing the liberal
288
of inventions in the very early stages of development.
In part, the approach to patentability articulated by the above
commentary resembles the approach to soft obviousness with which
second tier patent proposals struggle.289 Advocates of second tier patent protection certainly would assert that the soft obviousness standard
in second tier patent protection, like the standard which derives from
the prospect theory, emphasizes the need for rights to attach to subpatentable advances achieved in the course of bringing an invention to the
stage of commercial viability.
On the other hand, second tier patent proposals seem to assume that
the subject matter of second tier applications will inevitably constitute
modest variations on existing technologies. This diverges from the

285. Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1086-88. By contrast, without any rights in the prospect, the
inventor might be obliged to spend resources attempting to negotiate a confidentiality agreement

in order to preserve the opportunity to file for regular patent protection.
286. Kitch, supra note 277, at 284.
287. See, eg., Oddi, supra note 278, at 282 (stating that Kitch "discards the nonobviousness

standard for invention as being irrelevant to the prospect theory").
288. Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1090-91.

289. The Australian Innovation Patent System, for example, would employ a "modified novelty" test. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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prospect theory model in that this subject matter is presumably created at late stages in the development process. This subject matter, in
other words, is fundamentally not a technological prospect arising
early in the course of development efforts. Actually, the prospect theory could offer an important insight for policymakers: it may challenge
the apparent assumption that second tier patent subject matter will
always be about downstream improvements. One could envision a second tier application directed to raw technological information not yet
developed to the point of patentable invention-a true implementation
of the prospect theory. Whether or not such subject matter will be protectable under second tier regimes will depend largely upon the evolution of the enablement requirement and other description requirements in the context of second tier regimes. Certainly, the filing of
such applications would place pressure on such requirements, and it
would be of considerable interest to see whether courts gradually developed enablement standards (or other adequacy of description standards) that were more forgiving than those prevalent in regular patent
29 0
law.
The prospect theory also predicts a softer obviousness standard tied
very closely to commercial potential. 29' In doctrinal terms common to
U.S. patent law, this would translate to giving a major role to so-called
"secondary considerations" of nonobviousness, 92 particularly the
"commercial success" consideration. 293 Similarly, other secondary con290. Considerations of dual protection and priority would also be implicated if applicants began routinely seeking second tier protection for raw technological information, given that sophisticated applicants might well file a second tier application to preserve priority and to acquire
quick protection pending the issuance of a regular patent. See snpra notes 188-189 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for this use of second tier patent applications).
291. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1090 (arguing that the prospect theory calls for patentability standards allowing patent rights to issue "for almost any new use of existing technology that appears to have commercial possibilities").
292. Under U.S. law, a court assesses obviousness by considering a three-part set of primary
inquiries (the scope of the prior art; the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art; and the level of ordinary skill in the art), along with so-called "secondary" considerations,
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Judge Rader has recently summarized the
law on secondary considerations:
The secondary considerations are also essential components of the obviousness determination. This objective evidence of nonobviousness includes copying, long felt but unsolved
need, failure ofothers, commercial success, unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses showing industry respect for
the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention ....
In re Rouffet, 149 E3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir., 1998) (citations omitted).
293. Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1094; Kitch, supra note 277, at 283, Professor Merges, however, has provided powerful arguments against the economic premises underlying this argument.
See Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1095, note 263; Robert R Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. Rav. 803, 841 (1988). For additional
views on secondary considerations, particularly on the commercial success standard, see, e.g.,
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circudt: A CaseStudy in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1,
9-10 (1989) (arguing that the secondary considerations have been appropriately limited by a
vigorous requirement for a "nexus" to the claimed invention); Reed W.L. Marcy, Note, Patent
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siderations focusing on the "economic" rather than the "technical" aspects of an invention would seem to have a high profile under the
94
prospect theory.
Here, too, similarities exist between the prospect theory's approach
to patentability and that evinced by new second tier patent proposals.
The European White Paper, for example, calls for a soft obviousness
standard that awards second tier rights to inventions that provide the
solution to a technical problem or enhance the practical effectiveness of
existing technology.295 This approach to obviousness seems loosely
reminiscent of the wide-ranging approach that secondary considerations facilitate. For example, an evaluation of how a claimed invention
satisfies a long-felt need may be roughly similar to an evaluation under
the second tier regime of a claimed invention's capacity to solve a
"technical problem."
Surprisingly, then, second tier patent regimes designed in accordance with existing proposals could prove interesting as objects of
study for intellectual property theorists who are interested in testing
the viability of Kitch's prospect theory on empirical grounds. This
would be of particular interest considering that one of the major criticisms lodged against the prospect theory is its failure to correlate with
empirical evidence. 296 Second tier protection could assist in resolving
the debate over whether the prospect theory enjoys any empirical support.
Still, from a theoretical standpoint, there are many reasons to expect
that second tier patent regimes will only confirm the shortcomings of
the prospect theory. Concerns about rent dissipating races to acquire
second tier protection seem especially serious. Rent dissipation refers
to the idea that "the benefit to society of an invention is dissipated
when there are redundant development efforts .... " Rent dissipation
Laws Nonobvioeness Requirement: The Effect of Inconsistent Standards RegardingCommercial Success on
the Individual Inventor, 19 HAsTINGS COMM.IENT. LJ. 199, 200 (1996) (predicting that heavy
reliance on commercial success will cut against patent protection for small market-share inventors).
294. Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1096 (listing secondary considerations such as evidence of
copying and evidence ofmultiple licenses granted under the patent).
295. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
296. For example, Kitch's views depend at least in part on an empirical assumption that many
inventors acquire patent protection far in advance of the appearance of any commercial product.
See Kitch, supra note 277. Professor Eisenberg has argued that empirical evidence seems to undermine this assumption. Eisenberg, supra note 279, at 1042 (citing sources of empirical evidence
at note 108); Oddi, supra note 278, at 282 (noting that the prospect theory has been criticized on
empirical grounds and citing sources).
Questions have also been raised about the extent to which the prospect theory is premised on
the assumption of competition with the patented invention. See Oddi, supra note 278, at 282
(asserting that the prospect theory requires the assumption of a substantially horizontal demand
curve, indicating competition with the claimed invention); but c. Lemley, supra note 244, at
1047, n.270 (pointing out that Kitch seems merely to be adverting to the possibility of competition with the patented invention, not establishing a prerequisite).
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is understood today as a fundamental concern in the economically
297
efficient operation of patent systems in developed economies.
It has been argued that the soft obviousness standard featured in the
prospect theory actually works against rent-dissipating races for patent
rights. 298 By employing a flexible and wide-ranging assessment focusing on considerations such as commercial potential and other loosely
formulated versions of the current secondary considerations, the prospect theory supposedly provides for an allocation of rights early in the
process of commercialization. In theory, this severely limits any
wasteful races by effectively crowning a clear "winner" early in the
process. Similar claims are likely to be made in the context of second
tier patent protection, which also hinges on a soft obviousness standard.
However, second tier patent protection actually strives to establish
the very conditions that would encourage wasteful rent dissipation and
thwart economically efficient operation of the patent system. Soft obviousness sets a low threshold for protectability. Fee structures and
minimal pre-grant examination requirements are all designed to increase the number of players who could acquire patent rights. Collectively, these requirements increase the potential for rent dissipation as
multiple players rush to be the first to lock up key improvements on
existing patented technology.299 The prospect theory has been faulted
300
for these very qualities.

297. Grady & Alexander, supra note 282, at 316. Grady and Alexander point out that rent dissipation might occur both at the conception stage (as researchers rush to be the first to secure
broad patent protection in an emerging new area of technology) and at the follow-on stage (as
developers race to create commercially attractive improvements to pioneering technological
breakthroughs). Id. at 317 (arguing that a proper analysis must balance both considerations, i.e.,
the "savings in reduced follow-on investment against the losses from accelerating pioneering
investment"). See also Merges & Nelson, supra note 257, at 871 (referring to the costs of rivalrous
inventive efforts).
298. Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1090.
299. The problem is further complicated in the United States, where patents are awarded to
the "first to invent" as defined in 35 U.S.C. 102(g). Priority disputes among multiple inventors,
each of whom claims to be the first to invent, would presumably have to be resolved through
litigation, given that the establishment of a lengthy interference procedure would seem to be
inconsistent with the central notion of avoiding pre-grant substantive examination in second tier
systems.
300. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 278, at 282 (arguing that "because of the high incentive to be
first and the minimum standard for protectability, there will be high rent dissipation at the conception stage for inventions, which may far
overbalance the limitation of rent dissipation at the
innovation stage") (citing Grady & Alexander, supra note 282, at 317).
Rhodes sees two major sources ofpotential rent dissipation under the prospect theory:
(1) the award of rights early in the commercialization process, before much money has been
expended on developing the invention, means that many players are in position to go after
such rights, increasing the potential for rent dissipation; and (2) the broad claim scope that
the prospect theory seems to encourage heightens the incentive to race for patent rights.
Rhodes, supra note 284, at 1088-89. Rhodes gives the impression that he believes that the prospect theory is able to compensate for this tendency to encourage rent dissipation.
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There is more to the efficient operation of a patent system than
merely guarding against rent dissipation. A complementary objective
is the optimization of innovation over time. That is, a patent system
"should not only avoid wasteful competitive R & D, but it should also
avoid encroaching on future R & D that is socially desirable." 30 1 A soft
obviousness standard characteristic of proposed second tier patent regimes could encroach on future innovation efforts in at least two important ways that echo arguments that I outlined earlier. 30 2 First, its
opaqueness could generate a chilling effect. Marketplace participants
will find it extremely difficult and costly to determine which second
tier patents are validly issued, and they may find it expedient to avoid
innovative behavior that in fact would be perfectly acceptable and indeed desirable. Second, the low threshold of protectability established
by soft obviousness could facilitate the unwise fragmentation of rights.
Professor Dam makes a similar argument in connection with the prospect theory and the operation of the regular patent system:
Whatever the merits of the dispute between Kitch and his critics,
it is important that the line between the patented and the unpatented be clearly demarcated in the patent itself, rather than being
left to future litigation, so that a green light is given to R & D
beyond that line .... Since most scientists and engineers do their
R & D work without patent lawyers at their sides, their normal
work should not be hampered by unexpected patents. In this respect the nonobviousness requirement plays an important prophylactic role. It sharply limits littering of the innovation landskilled
scape with land mines consisting of patents on what those
30 3
in the trade would assume to be in the public domain.
Second tier protection deliberately disables the obviousness requirement from fully carrying out this role.
C. Second Tier Protectionand the Legal Hybrids Problem: Property Regimes
vs. Liability Regimesfor the Protection of SubpatentableInnovation
Second tier patent regimes unquestionably devote themselves to the
protection of subpatentable innovation, innovation that falls into the
gap between patent and copyright protection. But it is not the case
that in the absence of second tier regimes, all subpatentable innovation
goes unprotected. In the United States, state trade secret law can be
used to protect that range of subpatentable innovation that meets
minimum requirements of confidentiality and value. The TRIPs
301. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic UnderpinningsofPatent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 247, 266

(1994).
302. Se supra Part II.A.
303. Dam, supranote 301, at 267.
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agreement imposes similar standards worldwide. 3°4 Fundamentally,
then, the United States has chosen to protect a limited range of subpatentable innovations through a mixed property/liability regime 30 5
built around a well-established concept of trade secret misappropriation, 30 6 leaving the remainder of subpatentable innovations to the
public domain.
Second tier patent protection represents a dramatic change of direction. In its essence, second tier patent protection embodies a choice to
confer property rights on subpatentable innovation in addition to
leaving it to a mixed property/liability regime. 30 7 Second tier protection thus implicates the debate between the relative merits of property
and trade secrets regimes, which in turn is part of a larger debate in
legal scholarship comparing property and liability regimes generally.30 8
To be sure, the choice to create a property regime rather than leaving subpatentable innovation to a liability regime might seem, on its
face, to have something to recommend it. In Europe, for example, the
Green Paper authors have argued that offering expanded second tier
protection will result in a greater level of disclosures to the public of
incremental innovations. 309 However, the incentive-to-disclose rationale, a common one employed in connection with the regular patent
system, 310 does not fit well for either classic utility model regimes or
for modern second tier patent proposals. As to the former, the spatial
form requirement fulfills no meaningful function, and in fact causes

304. TRIPs Agreement, stpranote 6, at Art. 39.

305. Scholars divide over the extent to which trade secrets sound in tort or in property. See,
eg., Reichman, Legal Hybrids,supra note 61, at 2507 nA19 (citing sources reflecting the disparity
of views).
306. For an overview of the concept of trade secret misappropriation, see generally Uniform
Trade Secrets Act § 1(2); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 39-45 (1995).

307. Others have defined utility model law as an alternative to trade secret law: "Although the
utility model laws have always required a qualitatively significant level of innovation to qualify

for protection, their primary function was arguably to provide artificial lead time to compensate
for the lack of natural lead time in trade secret law." Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 61, at
2458-59.

308. Indeed, although I explore the matter only briefly in this Article, the project of elaborating more fully on the implications of second tier protection in the larger context of the property/liability divide is a worthy one. For a probable starting point for such a project, see Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104

YALE I.J. 1027, 1092-94 (1995) (arguing for a liability regime that, as applied to intellectual
property, would feature a compulsory licensing scheme); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do
Liability Rides FacilitateBargaining?A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE ., 221 (1995); lan
Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability
Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995).
309. See COM(95)370, supra note 20, at 61-62 (urging that "[i]n systems which protect inventions with only a small inventive step, inventions are publicized which would otherwise have

been kept from the public for reasons ofconfidentiality").
310. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 279, at 1028-30 (discussing the incentive to disclose theory in connection with regular patent systems).
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the regime to be underprotective by potentially relegating to secrecy a
whole class of innovations. 311 As for the latter, second tier proposals are
overprotective because they would confer protection on subpatentable
innovation even where secrecy is not a commercially feasible option for
312
the inventor.
The decision to choose property rights over a liability regime for
subpatentable innovation implicates concerns over the proliferation of
"legal hybrids." Legal hybrids, in Professor Reichman's lexicon, are
"deviant regimes" which "crop up in the widening penumbra between
the patent and copyright subsystems where, in theory, only the rules of
free competition should prevail." 313 Utility model laws and design
protection laws, quite plainly, constitute prototypical examples of hybrid intellectual property regimes. 31 4 They were, as Professor Reichman puts it, "devised to cure a type of market failure resulting from
the chronic inability of either the patent or copyright regimes to ensure that innovative industrial designers could appropriate the fruits of
their investments." 315 Legal hybrid regimes have tended to proliferate,
which may be problematic by itself,316 and may also signal more profound systemic weaknesses. 31 7 Moreover, the risk of systemic instability may be particularly high today due to the difficulties that traditional patent and copyright regimes have experienced in dealing with
318
new computer technology.
Second tier patent regimes seem inevitably to confront an intractable dilemma. On the one hand, if they are designed along the lines of
311. Professor Reichman may have had similar considerations in mind when he argued that:
Viewed only in its historical context, a decision to allow innovative tool. designs to escape
free competition, but not a host of other innovative creations that seem no less deserving of
protection, appears hard to justify. Viewed within a broader context of other deviant regimes, utility model laws fail to recognize the growing need to protect tangible embodiments of know-how that do not qualify for patent or trade secret protection.
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 61, at 2459.
312. The same objection can be made to the use of the incentive-to-disclose rationale to justify
the regular patent system.
313. Reichman, IndustrialDesigns, supra note 21, at 48-1, n.1.
314. Id. at 48-1 (asserting that utility model regimes, along with design protection regimes,
are the earliest examples of legal hybrids in intellectual property). See also supra Part L.A (discussing the origin of utility model laws); LLEWELYN, supra note 86, at 43 (noting Reichman's work
on legal hybrids in connection with an analysis ofsecond tier protection).
315. Reichman, IndutrialDesigns, supra note 21, at 48-2.
316. In addition to the obvious costs of a growing patchwork of essentially ad hoc intellectual
property rights, each successive acceptance of a legal hybrid regime may create an environment in
which the succeeding regime seems more palatable, eventually reaching a point which will undermine the integrity of the collective intellectual property system. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids,
sapra note 61, at 2503 (arguing that legal hybrids are likely to introduce "a cumulative protectionist bias into domestic economies driven by constant innovation. .. ").
317. It may, for example, signal that the protection of incremental innovation through a system of second tier property rights is inherently flawed and results in instability.
318. See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 61, at 2500 (arguing that the bipolar patent/copyright regime has "irretrievably broken down" due to the inability of those regimes to
deal with cutting edge technologies). This is one of Professor Reichman's primary claims.
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classical utility model regimes, protection will only extend to external
appearance because of the severe limitations imposed by the spatial
form requirement, 3 19 and the regimes will not adequately supplement
patent protection across any substantial range of subpatentable innovation. 320 On the other hand, if they are designed along the lines of modern second tier patent proposals, protection may be too broad, given
321
the dilution of the obviousness requirement.
This is precisely the sort of inherent instability that might lead one
to conclude that property regimes do not present an attractive solution
for the protection of subpatentable innovation. Yet trade secret law, as
currently formulated, is likewise an imperfect solution given that for
some types of subpatentable innovation, the maintenance of
confidentiality is not a commercially feasible goal. To Professor
Reichman, the solution is to devise a new liability regime, 322 a law of
"portable trade secrets" 323 that Professor Reichman has described in
324
some detail.
The analysis of modern second tier patent proposals offered in this
Paper does not point inexorably towards Professor Reichman's solution; that is not my object. The numerous flaws identified in the second tier proposals reinforce Professor Reichman's conclusion that current property rights regimes are not the answer for protecting subpatentable innovation. Many of the considerations already enumerated,
particularly the new insights gleaned through applications of the theory of anticommons property, suggest the desirability of further scholarly exploration of the prospect of protecting subpatentable innovation
with a regime that departs from a pure property rights model.
319. Courts might alter the nature of this protection by gradually relaxing the spatial form
requirement, as has apparently occurred in some jurisdictions. See supra notes 74-77, and accompanying text (discussing relaxation of the spatial form requirement in Japanese and German law).
Experience suggests that second tier protection, brought to this stage of development, is unsatisfactory: the protection is misleading on its face, the public lacks fair notice as to what is protected, and the case law surrounding a relaxed spatial form requirement is likely to be cumbersome.
320. Professor Reichman identifies the same problem, from the perspective of design protec-

tion. Reichman, supra note 21, IndustrialDesigns, at 48-11 to 48-12 (observing that ifsecond tier
patent rights only protect the owner from competitors who appropriate the design's external

appearance, the rights are of little value in protecting those designs for which the real value lies
in the design's functionality, nor in its appearance).
321. Seeid.

322. Reichman, IndustrialDesigns, supra note 21, at 48-11 (proposing that "because the problems of appropriability typically arise from the failure of classical trade secret law to provide
natural lead time under present-day conditions, the proper response is to devise a substitute set of
default liability rules that can cure market failure without creating new barriers to entry whose
social costs are likely to exceed those of underprotection itself.").
323. Professor Reichman's proposal for a "portable trade secrets" regime contemplates a short
initial "blocking period" for unregistered subject matter (which is intended to provide artificial
lead time) followed by an additional period of liability protection for registered subject matter.
Id. at 48-16.
324. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 61, at 2519-57.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to the formulation of recent second tier patent proposals in
Europe and Australia, Professor Reichman observed, with considerable
understatement, that second tier patent regimes "are hard to justify in
terms of classical intellectual property theory ... ,325 and that the
economic justification for awarding protection to subpatentable innovation had never been articulated satisfactorily.326 I have attempted to
show that this is still the case today, notwithstanding the substantial
emerging momentum for second tier harmonization in Europe. In fact,
I have attempted to show that on the basis of a more fully elaborated
theoretical analysis, drawing particularly on recent scholarship concerning "anticommons" property, that second tier proposals look worse
theoretically than they ever did before. Likewise, I have sought to
demonstrate that current second tier proposals do not find a solid
327
foundation in history or policy.
Nonetheless, the European Commission, despite the existence of
certain reservations, 328 seems bent on proceeding with the proposed
harmonization directive on utility models. 329 As of this writing, however, there is no apparent move to introduce second tier patent protection in the United States. The analysis in this Article strongly suggests
that modern second tier patent proposals, including both the European
and Australian initiatives, are ill-considered, and that Europe, Australia, and the United States would all be better served by directing energies towards the reform of regular patent law, and towards the exploration of alternative avenues for protecting incremental innovation.

325. See Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 50, at 811 (proceeding to warn that
"efforts to mitigate the strict substantive and formal prerequisites of patent law are symptomatic
of a larger malaise...").
326. See Reichman, IndustrialDesign, supra note 21, at 48-11.
327. There remains the task of conducting empirical research on existing second tier regimes
that follow along the general lines of current European and Australian proposals. The German
system, after the 1990 amendments, would be a worthy candidate for thoughtful empirical study
that focuses on the downstream consequences of expanded second tier protection, particularly
studying how second tier patent rights fare in enforcement proceedings. Fortunately, scholars are
developing models that allow for sophisticated empirical analysis of patent rights in litigation. See
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents
(manuscript on file with author).
328. See, eg., July 1998 Opinion, supra note 20, at C 235/26-27, points 2.6-2.7 (reiterating
prior views that studies advocating second tier patent protection are not necessarily "as totally
reliable as their authors appear to claim .... and emphasizing that the more pressing need may
be to reform regular patent protection in Europe).
329. See id. at 5, points 5.1, 5.4 (asserting that "[ultility models are an appropriate means of
protecting industrial property...... and that "the Commission's initiative appears capable of
achieving the aims it proposes...").

